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INTRODUCTION 
ollege football and men’s college basketball generate hundreds of 
millions of dollars each year.1 The National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) makes hundreds of millions of dollars2 and 
 
1 See, e.g., William B. Gould IV, Glenn M. Wong & Eric Weitz, Full Court Press: 
Northwestern University, A New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 8–
9 (2015). 
2 See id. at 9 (stating that the NCAA’s revenues reached over $900 million in 2012–13). 
In the spring of 2016, the NCAA signed an eight-year, $8.8 billion extension on top of a 
previously agreed upon $10.8 billion deal with CBS Sports and Turner Broadcasting System 
C 
GRENARDO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2017  3:46 PM 
2016] The Continued Exploitation of the College Athlete: Confessions 225 
of a Former College Athlete Turned Law Professor 
compensates its executives handsomely.3 Conferences and universities 
profit from their sports programs.4 Some coaches receive multimillion 
dollar contracts to coach and the opportunity to earn significantly 
through endorsements.5 
The astronomical amount of money generated by college athletics is 
built on the backs of college athletes, who are forbidden under current 
NCAA rules from earning compensation in addition to their 
scholarships—i.e., college athletes cannot earn compensation derived 
from their athletic skills through playing their sport (beyond the 
scholarship amount) or endorsements.6 College athletes produce the 
excitement and revenue of college athletics by performing, at times, 
incredible physical feats under enormous pressure and scrutiny that 
millions of people tune in to see. No one comes to see Nick Saban (the 
 
Inc. to broadcast the men’s college basketball tournament through 2032. CBS Sports, Turner 
Broadcasting NCAA Reach 14-Year Agreement, NCAA (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.ncaa 
.com/news/basketball-men/2010-04-21/cbs-sports-turner-broadcasting-ncaa-reach-14-year 
-agreement; CBS, Turner Sign $8.8 Billion Extension on NCAA Tournament Broadcast, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 12, 2016, 5:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/cbs       
-turner-sign-88-billion-extension-on-ncaa-tournament-broadcast_us_570d6470e4b083605 
7a2bb8c. 
3 See, e.g., Steve Berkowtiz, Emmert Made $1.7 million, According to NCAA Tax Return, 
USA TODAY (July 14, 2013, 1:16 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college 
/2013/07/10/ncaa-mark-emmert-salary-million-tax-return/2505667 (reporting President 
Mark Emmert made over $1.2 million in base salary alone, plus almost $500,000 more from 
deferred compensation and other sources of income during 2011); Libby Sander, Pay for 
Top 14 NCAA Executives Totaled Nearly $6-Million Last Year, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER 
EDUC. (Sept. 9, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Pay-for-Top-14-NCAA-Executives/124 
358 (reporting that, in 2009, thirteen NCAA executives each received six-figure salaries 
ranging from $270,000 to over $600,000, while the former NCAA President Myles Brand 
received over $1 million). 
4 See generally Gould IV, Wong & Weitz, supra note 1, at 8–13 (reflecting, for example, 
that the significant revenues of the NCAA amount to over $900 million). 
5 Lance Davis, The 5 Highest-paid College Football Coaches, BANKRATE, http://www 
.bankrate.com/lite/celebrity-money/highest-paid-college-football-coaches-2.aspx (last 
updated Aug. 17, 2016) (reporting Alabama head football coach earns over $7 million per 
year); see Aileen Graef, College Basketball Coaches Rake it in While Their Players Get 
Nothing, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Mar. 20, 2015, 1:39 PM), http://www.upi.com/Sports_News 
/College-Basketball/2015/03/20/College-basketball-coaches-rake-it-in-while-their-players 
-get-nothing/2621426865542 (indicating Duke Blue Devils’ basketball coach, Mike 
Krzyzewski, makes $9.7 million per year). 
 6 See NCAA 2015–2016 DIV. I MANUAL, bylaw 12.1.2 (2015), http://www.ncaapublica 
tions.com/productdownloads/D116.pdf [hereinafter NCAA BYLAWS] (providing that a 
college athlete becomes ineligible if one “[u]ses his or her athletics skill (directly or 
indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport”). 
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Alabama University head football coach)7 throw a pass or Mike 
Krzyzewski (head coach of Duke University’s men’s basketball team)8 
make a three-pointer. All the while, college athletes risk serious injury 
and their long-term health, particularly in football, which is simply a 
sport of controlled violence.9 Indeed, Chronic Traumatic 
Encephalopathy (CTE), a life-threatening condition stemming from 
concussions, has been diagnosed in a number of deceased football 
players.10 Yet, athletes in major college sports are deprived of earning 
money for playing and licensing the rights to their names, images, and 
likenesses.11 The incredible inequities flowing from this situation 
shock the conscience.12 
 
7 Nick Saban, ROLLTIDE.COM, http://rolltide.com/coaches.aspx?rc=545&path=football 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
8 Men’s Basketball Coaches, GODUKE.COM, http://www.goduke.com/SportSelect.dbml 
?&DB_OEM_ID=4200&SPID=1845&SPSID=22725 (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
9 I suffered two concussions and separated my shoulder three times in high school playing 
football. My college football career ended abruptly during my senior season when I ruptured 
a tendon in my ring finger at practice that required season-ending surgery or, if I had chosen 
to play the rest of the season, the loss of use of that finger. 
10 Sam Mellinger, Doctors Couldn’t Find What was Wrong with Michael Keck, but 
Football Star Knew It Would Kill Him, THE KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 21, 2015, 9:52 PM), 
http://www.kansascity.com/sports/spt-columns-blogs/sam-mellinger/article45850180.html 
(chronicling the death of a 25-year-old who suffered from CTE after playing football in high 
school and only one full year in college). 
11 See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at bylaw 12.1.2 (prohibiting a college athlete from 
using “his or her athletics skill [directly or indirectly] for pay in any form in that sport); 
NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at bylaw 12.5.2.1(a) (forbidding a college athlete from 
“[a]ccept[ing] any remuneration for or permit[ing] the use of his or her name or picture to 
advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial product or service 
of any kind”). 
12 See Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New 
Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 498 (2008) 
(arguing the rule that limits athlete’s compensation to the costs of tuition, books, room, and 
board constitutes price-fixing, which is actionable under antitrust laws); Stephen L. Ukeiley, 
No Salary, No Union, No Collective Bargaining: Scholarship Athletes are Employer’s 
Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 167, 169–72 (1996) (discussing that while 
coaches get millions of dollars in signing bonuses and millions of dollars from endorsement 
deals for making their players wear Nikes, college athletes receive nothing in 
compensation); Kathryn Young, Note, Deconstructing the Façade of Amateurism: Antitrust 
and Intellectual Property Arguments in Favor of Compensating Athletes, 12 VA. SPORTS 
AND ENT. L.J. 338, 343–47 (2013) (arguing the NCAA practices of fixing prices for 
scholarships and alleging that profiting from merchandise is not an economic activity is 
contrary to common usage and ultimately violates antitrust laws); Taylor Branch, The Shame 
of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine 
/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/ (describing the noble principles of 
the NCAA as cynical hoaxes used by universities to exploit their athletes and stating “the 
tragedy at the heart of college sports is not that some college athletes are getting paid, but 
that more of them are not”). 
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The NCAA places no cap on how much college coaches, athletic 
directors, or NCAA employees can earn. For example, the four head 
coaches who participated in the 2016 college football playoff earned 
between over $3 million and $7 million in salaries—amounts which do 
not even include potential bonuses.13 College athletes, on the other 
hand, cannot earn compensation in excess of their scholarships,14 and 
these scholarships fall short of covering even their full expenses at 
colleges that use the traditional grant-in-aid scholarships, which cover 
tuition, room, books, and board. The NCAA and major conferences 
recognized and conceded this shortfall when they adopted “autonomy 
legislation”15 that allowed major conferences to cover the gap between 
grant-in-aid scholarships and the full cost of attendance (that can 
include transportation to and from school, miscellaneous personal 
expenses, administrative fees), which can range between $2000 and 
$5000.16 
 
13 Jon Solomon, How 2015 College Football Playoff Teams Make and Spend Money, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon       
-solomon/25429334/how-college-football-playoff-teams-make-and-spend-money. 
14 See, e.g., NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at bylaw 12.01.4 (providing that a grant-in-
aid cannot exceed the costs of tuition and fees, room and board, books, and other expenses 
related to the attendance of the institution); id. at bylaw 12.1.2.1.1 (prohibiting student 
athletes from receiving any type of direct or indirect salary, gratuity or comparable 
compensation); id. at bylaw 12.01.4 (stating that a student-athlete may not be awarded 
financial aid that exceeds the cost of attendance that is normally incurred by students at that 
institution). 
15 In 2014, the NCAA passed legislation allowing the Power Five conferences, which 
include the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big 12 Conference, Big 10 Conference, Pac-
12 Conference, and the Southeastern Conference (SEC), to pass rules or make changes to 
existing rules regarding their athletes in certain areas of autonomy. NCAA BYLAWS, supra 
note 6, at bylaw 5.02.1.1. The areas of autonomy include, among others, college athlete 
“loans to purchase career-related insurance products (e.g., disability, loss-of-value),” career-
planning events and advisors for athletes, financial aid, “awards, benefits and expenses for 
enrolled student-athletes and their families and friends,” academic support, meals and 
nutrition, and time demands on a college athlete. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at bylaw 
5.3.2.1.2. Schools outside of the Power Five conferences may decide to follow any 
autonomy legislation passed by the Power Five conferences, but those non-Power Five 
conference schools are not required to do so. NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at bylaw 
5.3.2.1.2.2. 
16 Brian Bennet, NCAA Board Votes to Allow Autonomy, ESPN (Aug. 8 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11321551/ncaa-board-votes-allow-autonomy   
-five-power-conferences (stating “the full cost-of-attendance stipends . . . could be worth 
between $2,000 and $5,000 per player”); Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Autonomy Schools Adopt 
Cost of Attendance Scholarships: College Athletes’ Viewpoints Dominate Business Session 
Discussions (Jan. 18, 2015, 6:58 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media -
center/autonomy-schools-adopt-cost-attendance-scholarships (discussing the rule adopted 
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Coaches can also make substantial sums through endorsements 
either in addition to, or as a part of, their coaching salaries.17 For 
example, Ohio State University head football coach Urban Meyer made 
$1.4 million from a deal with Nike and Ohio State and an additional 
$1.85 million from, among other things, radio and television shows.18 
Players, on the other hand, cannot enter into endorsement deals, but 
they can go to bed hungry despite being on a supposedly full 
scholarship. Shabazz Napier, awarded the most valuable player of the 
NCAA Basketball Tournament’s Final Four in 2014, revealed that 
some nights he went to bed starving because the meal plans provided 
for scholarship athletes are not always enough.19 Representative 
Matthew Lesser, a Connecticut legislator, said of Napier: “He says he’s 
going to bed hungry at a time when millions of dollars are being made 
off of him. It’s obscene . . . . This isn’t a Connecticut problem. This is 
an NCAA problem, and I want to make sure we’re putting pressure on 
them to treat athletes well.”20 
After the star basketball player’s revealing comments, the NCAA 
approved unlimited meal plans for college athletes, but keeping the 
athletes who create the product on the field well-fed is simply a wise 
investment as opposed to a magnanimous action.21 Also, feeding the 
 
through autonomy that allows schools to provide scholarships that cover the full cost of 
attendance). 
17 Telephone Interview with Jay Bilas, J.D., ESPN Analyst, Of Counsel, Moore & Van 
Allen (July 24, 2015) [hereinafter Bilas Interview] (arguing that coaches and assistant 
coaches can make millions of dollars, and that players should also be allowed to earn in a 
free market system) (on file with author). 
18 Associated Press, Urban Meyer’s Contract Revealed, ESPN (June 18, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/8067358/urban-meyer-contract-ohio-state      
-buckeyes-outlines-violation-reporting. 
19 Sara Ganim, UConn Guard on Unions: I go to Bed ‘Starving’, CNN (Apr. 8, 2014, 
1:26 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/07/us/ncaa-basketball-finals-shabazz-napier-
hungry/index.html. 
20 Id. Mr. Napier’s story regarding a lack of funds for food is nothing new. Scholarship 
football players at Rice that lived off-campus received a stipend. I lived off-campus my 
junior year and received a stipend of $385. The monthly stipend not only needed to pay for 
lunch during the week—with about twenty such lunches during a month—but it also needed 
to cover rent and utilities. After paying rent and utilities, I was fortunate if I still had $40 to 
pay for the twenty lunches during the month, which would be $2 dollars per lunch. The 
stipend failed to come close to covering my expenses, including food. As a result, I lived on 
campus the other three years where lunch during the week, the dorms, and utilities were 
covered by my scholarship. 
21 Stephen Hobbs, Approved NCAA Rule Allowing Unlimited Meals and Snacks to Affect 
Cal Athletes, THE DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.dailycal.org/2014/04 
/24/approved-ncaa-rule-allowing-unlimited-meals-snacks-affect-cal-athletes; Michelle 
Brutlag Hosick, Council Approves Meals, Other Student-Athlete Well-Being Rules, NCAA 
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athletes or paying for their full cost of attendance amounts to paying 
for expenses, which falls well short of addressing the true issue: 
whether college athletes should receive compensation above their 
scholarship amounts based on the billions of dollars they generate 
through playing sports. 
Coaches can also earn indirect compensation. For instance, boosters 
paid off Nick Saban’s $3 million mansion to entice him to stay at 
Alabama.22 Meanwhile, as an alumnus, I could not buy a Rice college 
basketball player who interned at my law firm a five-dollar Subway 
sandwich while she was at work because doing so would violate NCAA 
rules.23 As a precaution, I even had to inform others in my firm that 
they could not pay for her lunch because doing so might constitute an 
NCAA violation. Although I could provide a meal for a Rice athlete at 
my home, I first had to report how many athletes would attend, where 
the food would come from, the date of the dinner, and the attendees’ 
names.24 Finally, I had to submit that form to the Rice NCAA 
compliance office.25 The convoluted NCAA rules allow boosters to 
pay off a football coach’s mansion, but they prevented me from buying 
a sandwich for a college athlete who interned at my law firm. 
Many receive lavish compensation packages in this business of 
major college sports, but once everyone else is paid, those who have 
been paid argue that no money remains to pay the college athletes.26 
 
(Apr. 15, 2014, 4:25 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/council 
-approves-meals-other-student-athlete-well-being-rules. 
22 Alex Scarborough, Bama Boosters Pay Off Saban’s Home, ESPN (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/11772033/alabama-crimson-tide-boosters      
-pay-coach-nick-saban-home. 
23 See NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at bylaw 16.11.1.5 (stating that a college athlete or 
the entire team may receive an occasional meal from a representative of athletics interests 
on infrequent and special occasions so long as the meal, which can be catered, is provided 
at the individual’s home or on campus). 
24 Id. at bylaw 16.11.1.5 (stating that a college athlete or the entire team may receive an 
occasional meal from a representative of athletics interests on infrequent and special 
occasions so long as the meal, which can be catered, is provided at the individual’s home or 
on campus); Occasional Meal Form, TULANE UNIV., http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools 
/tul/genrel/auto_pdf/2014-15/misc_non_event/occasional-meal-form.pdf (last visited Nov. 
9, 2016); Occasional Meals, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME, http://ncaacompliance.nd.edu 
/documents/OccasionalMeals.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
25 See, e.g., NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at bylaw 2.8 (stating that each institution shall 
monitor and comply with all applicable rules and regulations of the NCAA). 
26 See, e.g., Gould IV, Wong & Weitz, supra note 1; Graef, supra note 5; Steve 
Berkowitz, NCAA Paid Mark Emmert $1.9M in 2014, Tax Return Shows, USA TODAY 
(June 23, 2016, 3:16 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2016/06/23/ncaa 
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The notion that college athletes should not receive compensation 
beyond their scholarships hangs on a loose thread woven on the 
nostalgic idea that college athletes are amateurs and should not be 
compensated because that could somehow taint the games.27 This 
premise is a fallacy because college athletes are already compensated 
for playing sports—they receive tuition, room, books, and board, which 
are forms of compensation. It also ignores the economic reality of what 
major college football and men’s basketball has evolved into—
professional sports.28 
The proper question to ask is, should college athletes be able to 
receive more compensation because of the revenues they generate? The 
free market approach and equity dictate that the answer should 
unequivocally be yes. College athletes remain the firsthand suppliers 
of a product that the public is consuming in droves.29 They should be 
compensated for providing those arduous services.30 College athletes 
 
-tax-return-mark-emmert-jim-isch/86287914 (detailing how much NCAA executives were 
compensated in 2014). 
27 See David J. Berri, Paying NCAA Athletes, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 479, 482–83 
(2016) (stating that the principle of amateurism is intended to promote competitive balance); 
Virginia A. Fitt, The NCAA’s Lost Cause and the Legal Ease of Redefining Amateurism, 59 
DUKE L.J. 555, 559 (2009) (stating that “[a]mateurism is assumed to be good . . . [and the] 
notion of amateurism is characterized by nostalgia for a time when sport was played for pure 
love”); Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of “Big Time” 
College Athletics: The Need to Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of 
Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 2 
(2000) (discussing the NCAA’s aim to maintain amateurism). 
28 Bilas Interview, supra note 17 (“[I]t’s a million dollar business and financial decisions 
are made all the time and everybody [except the athletes] operates as [though it is] a free 
market system.”). 
29 College Sports (NCAA)—Statistics & Facts, STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/topics 
/1436/college-sports-ncaa (last visited Oct. 28, 2016) (approximating 49 million people 
attended college football games [Division I, II, and III] in 2012, 54 million people watched 
at least one college basketball game on TV in 2014, and 29 million people attended at least 
one college sports game in 2014); Austin Ward, Ohio State Breaks Own Record for 
Attendance in Spring Game, ESPN (Apr. 16, 2016), http://espn.go.com/college-football 
/story/_/id/15217254/ohio-state-breaks-own-record-attendance-spring-game (stating 
attendance at the Ohio State University’s 2016 spring practice football game exceeded 
100,000 people); see Every SEC Spring Game to be Televised, SEC SPORTS (Mar. 23, 2016), 
http://www.secsports.com/article/15048848 (reporting that all Southeastern Conference 
football teams will have their spring football games nationally televised); see also Derek 
Volner, ESPN3 to Stream Six ACC College Football Spring Games, ESPN MEDIAZONE 
(Mar. 23, 2016), http://espnmediazone.com/us/press-releases/2016/03/espn3-to-stream-six 
-acc-college-football-spring-games (showing that ESPN3 streamed the spring games for 
Duke, Kansas, Clemson, Wake Forest, Florida State, Miami, Stephen F. Austin State 
University, and Georgia Tech). 
30 Richard T. Karcher, Broadcast Rights, Unjust Enrichment, and the Student-Athlete, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 107, 129 (2012) (arguing universities are unjustly enriched when they 
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should also be able to license their own names, images, and likenesses. 
Instead, they are treated differently than every other college student.31 
Jay Bilas, a former Duke University standout basketball player, 
Duke assistant coach, and Duke University School of Law graduate, 
now works as an analyst with ESPN and serves as Of Counsel with the 
Charlotte law firm of Moore & Van Allen. Bilas states, “[t]here is no 
other student that is required to be an amateur in their chosen field 
while they’re in school. So every other student can make as much 
money as they want in their chosen endeavor, and it doesn’t affect their 
academic standing.”32 For example, a student musician can earn 
thousands of dollars performing at off-campus events without suffering 
any negative consequences, such as losing eligibility to participate in 
university musical performances, even if the person paying the student 
musician is affiliated with the student’s university.33 Bilas believes 
“[t]here is no legitimate reason why an athlete should be [treated] any 
different[ly].”34 
Opponents of college athletes receiving compensation above their 
scholarships argue that they will “cash-in” when they play professional 
sports.35 College athletics provide these athletes with training, the 
exposure they need to reach the professional ranks, and also the only 
 
use college athletes’ images and likenesses for gain without compensating them); see Alex 
Moyer, Note, Throwing Out the Playbook: Replacing the NCAA’s Anticompetitive 
Amateurism Regime with the Olympic Model, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 775 (2015) 
(stating that the average amount of time that college athletes spend on athletic activities is 
more than forty hours per week). 
31 See Karen Crouse, When an Olympian Goes to College, Riches Stay Out of Reach, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/sports/olympics/katie      
-ledecky-olympian-goes-to-college-riches-stay-out-of-reach.html?_r=2; Bilas Interview, 
supra note 17 (stating that “every other student can make as much money as they want in 
their chosen endeavor and it doesn’t affect their academic standing” and “[t]here is no 
legitimate reason why an athlete should be any different”). 
32 Bilas Interview, supra note 17. 
33 See Crouse, supra note 31 (discussing how music students can earn compensation for 
performances, including money from individuals with ties to the university, which is 
encouraged). 
34 Id.; see Karen Crouse, When an Olympian Goes to College, Riches Stay Out of Reach, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/sports/olympics/katie      
-ledecky-olympian-goes-to-college-riches-stay-out-of-reach.html?_r=2 (revealing that 
some graduate student musicians “earned as much as $20,000 a year performing freelance 
engagements, or with area orchestras and chamber ensembles, or both”). 
35 See, e.g., Kieran McCauley, College Athletes Shouldn’t Be Paid, DAILY LOCAL NEWS 
(Apr. 28, 2015, 5:28 PM), http://www.dailylocal.com/article/DL/20150428/SPORTS/1504 
29826 (arguing that “the players who are so good and entertain us in college will eventually 
get paid” in the pros, while scholarships are sufficient for the other players). 
GRENARDO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2017  3:46 PM 
232 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95, 223 
viable avenue for that career advancement. The vast majority of college 
athletes, however, fail to become professional athletes. In fact, only a 
little more than one percent of all college athletes in football and men’s 
basketball even get drafted by a team in the NFL or NBA, respectively, 
and even fewer make it onto a team.36 And for the small percentage of 
players who actually do make a team, the average length of an NFL 
player’s career spans slightly more than three years, while the average 
length of an NBA player totals fewer than five.37 Although the 
overwhelming majority of college athletes will not play a sport 
professionally, the NCAA deprives them of the opportunity to earn 
compensation while playing in college, even though they generate 
billions of dollars. That is why the NCAA and college conferences 
cling tightly to an amateurism rule—to keep the money for themselves. 
The NCAA also deprives college athletes of the opportunity to use 
their names, images, and likenesses to earn money during their 
collegiate career when those assets possess substantial value. If that 
prohibition were lifted, an outstanding college player could potentially 
receive an endorsement deal from McDonald’s while in college. Then, 
even if he fails to make a professional team and McDonald’s declines 
to extend his endorsement deal, he will still have had the opportunity 
to capitalize on his athletic accomplishments during college by 
accepting endorsement deals while in college. Empires like Nike and 
Adidas would have welcomed the opportunity to market and sell 
products with Cam Newton and Marcus Mariota while they were in 
college.38 Children, fans, and alumni adore and follow the careers of 
college athletes. If their favorite players could endorse a shoe or food, 
then those admirers would buy those products. College athletes could 
also sell their autographs and signed memorabilia in a regulated manner 
(e.g., every Thursday immediately after practice they could sign items 
and receive a substantial portion of the profits from the sale of both the 
 
36 Probability of Competing in Sports Beyond High School, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org 
/about/resources/research/probability-competing-beyond-high-school (last visited Oct. 28, 
2016). 
37 Cork Gaines, Chart: The Average NBA Player Will Make a lot More in His Career 
than the Other Major Sport, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2013, 4:24 PM), http://www 
.businessinsider.com/chart-the-average-nba-player-will-make-lot-more-in-his-career-than  
-the-other-major-sports-2013-10. 
38 See Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the 
Educational Values and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV. 
837, 850–51 n.49 (2014) (asserting that Johnny Manziel could earn $3500 from a single 
tweet). 
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autographs and memorabilia) as opposed to being reduced to signing 
items in a seedy parking lot or hotel room.39 
Child actors, singers, and performers are able to sell their services 
and unique talents because their work generates millions of dollars. For 
example, Home Alone movies starring child actor Macaulay Culkin 
generated an estimated $834 million, and Justin Bieber concerts 
grossed over $223 million.40 The law in the United States, which is 
predicated on capitalist, free market principles, allows individuals to 
earn money based on the fruits they generate.41 The archaic NCAA 
rules prohibit college athletes from earning compensation above their 
scholarship, which oppresses college athletes by depriving them of the 
opportunity to earn money based on their incredible abilities. 
This Article provides a unique perspective on why college athletes 
should be allowed to earn more than they already do, both in the form 
of compensation for playing on a college team as well as compensation 
from endorsements. My participation in college sports provides me 
with insight that is not otherwise readily available to others who write 
in this area. At Rice University, I experienced firsthand the demands of 
being a college athlete, lettering in football all four years while earning 
degrees in Political Science and Policy Studies. I garnered success as a 
scholar athlete, winning numerous honors including the Top Student 
Athlete for Rice Football during my junior year. This Article includes 
my experiences and perspective, sometimes in the form of confessions, 
to provide the reader with insight from a Division I scholarship athlete. 
I also possess insight about college athletics based on my service as 
a board member of the “R” Association, which is an organization 
 
39 Brett McMurphy, Todd Gurley Signing Details Emerge, ESPN GO (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/blog/sec/post/_/id/94756/todd-gurley-signing-details-emerge 
(discussing former college football standout Todd Gurley and the incident where he was 
suspended for signing memorabilia in a parking lot in exchange for $400, which led to his 
four-game suspension at the University of Georgia). 
40 See Tom Gerencer, Justin Bieber Net Worth, MONEYNATION (July 27, 2016), 
http://moneynation.com/justin-bieber-net-worth (showing Bieber concert tours have 
grossed over $223 million); Home Alone, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxoffice 
mojo.com/movies/?id=homealone.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2016) (indicating Home Alone 
grossed over $476 million worldwide); Home Alone 2: Lost in New York, BOX OFFICE 
MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=homealone2.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 
2016) (demonstrating Home Alone 2 grossed over $358 million worldwide). 
41 See William McGurn, Playing the Music of Capitalism, WALL STREET J. (July 10, 
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/playing-the-music-of-capitalism-1436568716 
(discussing the capitalist economy and indicating that individuals in this system will be 
rewarded for their hard work and enterprise). 
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composed of former Rice athletes that promotes the success of current 
and former Rice athletes.42 The “R” Association Board meets with the 
Athletic Director of Rice on occasion and interacts with alumni and 
current athletes. 
College athletics has grown into a multi-billion-dollar business, yet 
the NCAA and athletic conferences prohibit college athletes from 
earning compensation above the scholarships they currently receive, 
many of which are inadequate. Antitrust law provides a legal 
mechanism that should recognize that such a prohibition both violates 
our free market economy and also subjugates college athletes to the 
role of exploited providers of services without proper compensation. 
College athletes should be able to earn money based on playing sports 
for their colleges and universities, as well as for licensing the rights to 
their names, images, and likenesses through endorsements. 
Part I identifies the various constituents who are reaping the rewards 
generated by college athletes, including the NCAA, conferences, 
schools, coaches, athletic directors, and builders of extravagant athletic 
facilities. Part II discusses the free market approach that courts should 
employ to pay college athletes above their scholarships and to allow 
college athletes to endorse products. Part III discusses the 
counterarguments to compensating college athletes more than their 
scholarships. One of those counterarguments involves the “autonomy 
legislation,” which gives the Power Five conferences the power to 
make their own rules in certain areas, including on compensation. As 
later described, “autonomy” provides inadequate relief and serves as 
nothing more than a stop-gap, allowing universities and colleges to 
compensate college athletes only up to the full cost of attendance.43 
Part IV discusses the free market approach to compensating college 
athletes and the potential consequences of doing so. 
This Article concludes that college athletes should be entitled to earn 
compensation for playing major college sports, including the ability to 
profit from endorsing products. 
  
 
42 What is R Association?, RICE OWLS, http://www.riceowls.com/sports/r-assoc/spec-rel 
/r-assoc-about.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
43 Bilas Interview, supra note 17. 
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I 
COLLEGE FOOTBALL AND MEN’S BASKETBALL GENERATE BILLIONS 
OF DOLLARS 
The NCAA, conferences, schools, coaches, and athletic directors 
earn substantial amounts from men’s basketball and football, yet the 
NCAA forbids college athletes, who provide the product on the field 
and the court, from earning compensation above their scholarships. 
This Part discusses the revenues and benefits received by these 
constituents, as well as by the college athletes themselves. 
A. The NCAA Profits 
The NCAA is an unincorporated, not-for-profit organization that 
runs college athletics on a national level.44 It includes more than 1200 
member institutions and oversees all collegiate athletic competitions, 
including men’s basketball and football.45 The NCAA consists of three 
separate divisions for athletic competition—Division I, Division II, and 
Division III.46 In 1978, the NCAA divided Division I college football 
programs into Division I-A and Division I-AA.47 In 2006, the NCAA 
renamed Division I-A as the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) and 
Division I-AA as the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS).48 
Division I, which includes the FBS, represents the “highest level of 
intercollegiate athletics sanctioned by the NCAA.”49 The schools in 
Division I “generally have the largest student bodies, manage the 
largest athletic budgets and offer the most generous number of 
scholarships.”50 
 
44 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND SUBSIDIARIES: 
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF THE YEARS ENDED AUGUST 31, 2014 AND 
2013, SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR THE YEAR ENDED AUGUST 31, 2015, AND 
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT, NCAA 7 (2014), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default 
/files/2014-15NCAA_Financial_Statement.pdf. 
45 Id. 
46 Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivision Classification, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/divisional-differences-and-history       
-multidivision-classification (last visited Oct. 28, 2016). 
47 JOSEPH N. CRAWLEY, IN THE ARENA: THE NCAA’S FIRST CENTURY 43 (2006). 
48 Steve Wieberg, NCAA to Rename College Football Subdivisions, USA TODAY (Aug. 
3, 2006, 9:59 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2006-08-03          
-ncaa-subdivisions_x.htm. 
49 Gould IV, Wong & Weitz, supra note 1, at 7. 
50 NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 (last visited Oct. 
28, 2016). 
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The NCAA’s revenues totaled “over $900 million in 2012–13 . . . 
coming primarily from television and marketing rights related to the 
NCAA men’s basketball tournament.”51 The total expenses equaled a 
little over $850 million.52 The NCAA also maintains reserves “to guard 
and protect the future interests of its membership,” which in 2013 
amounted to over $400 million.53 The NCAA reported “over $589 
million in unrestricted net assets during the 2013 fiscal year.”54 
Most of the NCAA’s revenues are distributed to Division I 
institutions, with a majority of that money distributed to the 
conferences and some given directly to institutions.55 A large portion 
of the revenue distribution to Division I institutions “is based on 
success in the men’s basketball championship.”56 As a result of their 
teams’ success in the tournament, the Power Five conferences typically 
receive greater revenue distributions than the smaller conferences.57 
During the 2012–13 season, for example, “[t]he Power Five 
conferences received between $14.5 and $28.7 million from the NCAA 
basketball fund while the distributions to other conferences ranged 
 
51 See Gould IV, Wong & Weitz, supra note 1, at 9 (reflecting the revenues brought in 
by television and marketing). 
52 Id. at 10. 
53 See id. at 11. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 12. The six primary areas where the NCAA allocates money to its member 
institutions include the following: (1) basketball fund for performance in the NCAA 
tournament—$180.5 million expected in 2013—and multibillion dollar revenues from 
television contracts—$10.8 billion contract with CBS and Turner Sports to televise the 
men’s tournament; (2) academic support programs for Division I athletes—$22.4 million; 
(3) conference grants to “enhance officiating programs, compliance and enforcement, 
diversity, and drug and gambling education”—$251,097 in 2009–10—distributed for each 
conference; (4) grants-in-aid support that the NCAA distributes to schools based on how 
many scholarships the school awarded the previous school year—$111 million total given 
to Division I schools, with a school “that awarded 80.48 scholarships receiv[ing] $30,006” 
and a school “that awarded 242.44 scholarships receiv[ing] $675,725”; (5) sports 
sponsorships that the NCAA allocates to Division I schools “based on the number of varsity 
sports each school sponsored”—more than $55 million went to Division I schools; and (6) 
student assistance fund for “special assistance and student-athlete opportunity funds, which 
are designed to assist student-athletes who have exhausted their NCAA eligibility or are no 
longer able to participate in sports because of medical reasons”—nearly $40 million. Mark 
Schlabach, NCAA: Where Does the Money Go?, ESPN, (July 12, 2011), http://espn.go.com 
/college-sports/story/_/id/6756472/following-ncaa-money. 
56 Gould IV, Wong & Weitz, supra note 1, at 11. 
57 Id; see supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting that the NCAA previously passed 
legislation allowing five conferences, including the ACC, Big 12 Conference, Big 10 
Conference, Pac-12 Conference, and the SEC, which are collectively referred to as the 
Power Five conferences, to pass rules or make changes to existing rules regarding their 
athletes in certain areas of autonomy). 
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from $1.4 to $8.1 million.”58 Two non-Power Five conferences, the 
Metro Atlantic Conference and the Atlantic-10 Conference, received 
just over $2 million and $8 million , respectively, from the 2012–13 
season NCAA basketball fund.59 
The NCAA expenses also include “$41,875,827 (five percent of 
total expenses) for management and general expenses,” which 
presumably includes executive compensation.60 NCAA executives 
profit greatly.61 The President of the NCAA reportedly made $1.9 
million in 2014, and a number of other NCAA executives reportedly 
made over $4 million each.62 
The NCAA receives a great deal of money generated by major 
college sports that would not arise without the labor provided by 
college athletes.63 It is noteworthy that a large amount of distributions 
are made based on athletic success; they are not typically provided 
based on graduation rates or on academic performance of the schools 
and their athletes.64 This seems counterintuitive given the NCAA’s 
purported primary goal of education for its athletes. The NCAA also 
allows the scheduling of football and basketball games on weekdays, 
including Monday through Thursday,65 which seems 
counterproductive if the NCAA truly wants college athletes to study 
during the week while staying fresh for class and practice. 
B. Conferences and Universities Profit 
Conferences and schools, particularly in the Power Five 
conferences, enjoy exorbitant revenues from major college sports (i.e., 
football and men’s college basketball).66 During the 2012–13 academic 
 
58 Id. at 11–12. 
59 Id. at 12. 
60 See id. at 11. 
61 See Berkowitz, supra note 26. 
62 Id. 
63 See Gould IV, Wong & Weitz, supra note 1, at 9 (reflecting the revenues brought in 
by television and marketing, including the multibillion dollar deal between the NCAA and 
CBS/Turner Sports to broadcast the men’s basketball tournament). 
64 See 2015–16 DIVISION I REVENUE DISTRIBUTION PLAN, NCAA (2016), http://www 
.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2015-16DI_Revenue_Distribution_PlanFinal_20160622.pdf. 
65 See 2016 College Football Schedule, FBSCHEDULES, http://www.fbschedules.com 
/college-football-schedule/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2016); 2015–16 Men’s College Basketball 
TV Schedule, USA TODAY SPORTS (Oct. 29, 2015, 5:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com 
/story/sports/ncaab/2015/10/29/2015-16-mens-college-basketball-tv-schedule/74829074/. 
66 See Gould IV, Wong & Weitz, supra note 1, at 8–9 (discussing that the NCAA’s 
revenues are often distributed to conferences); see also Chris Smith, The Most Valuable 
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year, for example, the SEC “reported $314.5 million in overall 
revenue.”67 The SEC derives revenue from “televised football, bowl 
games, the SEC football championship, televised basketball, the SEC 
men’s basketball tournament, NCAA championships and a 
supplemental surplus distribution.”68 SEC revenues included, for 
example, a $55 million per year television deal with CBS, “a $2.25 
billion, 15-year deal ($150 million per year, annualized)” with ESPN 
to create the SEC television network, and “over $15.2 million in 
distributions” from the 2012–13 NCAA basketball fund.69 In May 
2014, the SEC announced a record distribution of $292.8 million, with 
each institution set to receive roughly $20.9 million.70 The $292.8 
million figure “represent[ed] over 90% of the SEC’s total revenues, and 
d[id] not include bowl game payouts ($16.8 million per participant) and 
NCAA academic enhancement funding ($1 million pool) directed to 
individual institutions.”71 Money earned from bowl game payouts in 
2013 totaled over $52 million for the SEC.72 
In addition to financial benefits, universities and colleges also 
receive recognition and publicity because of their men’s basketball and 
football teams. Exposure and success in college sports can lead to 
increased giving from donors, boosters, and alumni, as well as an 
increase in the quantity and quality of students that schools attract.73 
 
Conferences in College Sports 2014, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2014, 2:49 PM), http://www.forbes 
.com/sites/chrissmith/2014/04/15/the-most-valuable-conferences-in-college-sports-2014 
/#160ff408145c (reporting that the Power 5 conferences collected a combined $311 million 
from bowl games and tournament payouts in 2014, while smaller conferences collected 
anywhere from $22 to $72 million). 
67 Gould IV, Wong & Weitz, supra note 1, at 13. 
68 Id. at 12. 
69 Gould IV, Wong & Weitz, supra note 1, at 13. 
70 Id. Similarly, “[i]n May 2014, the Big 12 announced a record distribution of $220 
million in revenue to member institutions.” Id. at 14. 
71 Id. at 13–14. 
72 Id. at 15. In 2013, the football programs that generated the most revenue included 
Texas, Michigan, and Alabama, raking in $104.5 million, $85 million, and $81.9 million, 
respectively. Cork Gaines, The 25 Schools That Make the Most Money in College Football, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 16, 2013, 3:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-25              
-schools-that-make-the-most-money-in-college-football-2013-1?op=1. 
73 See generally Sean Silverthorne, The Flutie Effect: How Athletic Success Boosts 
College Applications, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2013, 9:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites 
/hbsworkingknowledge/2013/04/29/the-flutie-effect-how-athletic-success-boosts-college    
-applications (describing the phenomenon known as the “Flutie Effect”). 
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C. Coaches and Athletic Directors Profit, and Facilities Improve 
Coaches of men’s college basketball and football can earn millions 
of dollars in salary.74 In 2015, Urban Meyer made $4,536,640, Nick 
Saban earned $7,160,187 that same year, and Kevin Sumlin (Texas 
A&M University’s head football coach) made $5,006,000.75 Former 
University of Connecticut men’s basketball coach Jim Calhoun earned 
$1.6 million per year in his five-year contract signed in 2009.76 
Calhoun spoke infamously about his significant salary, stating that his 
program “turn[s] over twelve million dollars to the University of 
Connecticut.”77 When asked how much of his own salary he would 
give back to the school, Calhoun, as the highest salaried public 
employee in Connecticut during a recession, responded, “not a 
dime.”78 Coaches believe that they earn their salaries.79 As a player, I 
know that my coaches consistently worked 100-hour weeks during the 
season, a normal commitment for college coaches.80 College coaches 
 
74 Cf. NCAA Salaries: NCAAB Coaches, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com 
/ncaa/salaries/mens-basketball/coach (last visited Oct. 28, 2016) (giving examples such as 
John Calipari, the head coach for Kentucky’s basketball team, who is receiving $6,009,000 
in salary pay alone). 
75 NCAA Salaries: NCAAF Coaches, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa 
/salaries/football/coach (last visited Oct. 28, 2016). 
76 See Scott Cacciola, Last Stand for UConn’s Calhoun?, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 28, 
2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704471204575210401 
099496076 (stating Coach Calhoun received a contract for $9.1 million spread out over the 
course of six years). 
77 10titansfan10, Jim Calhoun Owns Reporter (Ken Krayeske), YOUTUBE (Feb. 21, 2009) 
https://www .youtube.com/watch?v=xokthY5zuPU.  
78 Id. 
79 Coaches believe they are worth those salaries based on the teams they put on the 
field/floor through recruiting, the intense preparation they provide their teams in order to 
compete through scouting other teams and game-planning, and the revenue generated by 
their programs. See, e.g., Monte Burke, Opinion, College Coaches Deserve Their Pay, 
WALL STREET J. (Aug. 30, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/college-coaches-deserve       
-their-pay-1440975551 (discussing how Nick Saban helped increase the revenues generated 
at Alabama); Andrew Zimbalist, College Coaches’ Salaries and Higher Education, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-zimbalist 
/college-coaches-salaries-_1_b_6400256.html (acknowledging a college “coach’s salary 
reflects the value of the athletes he brings to the school” through recruiting); Erik Sherman, 
College Basketball Coaches and Their Slam Dunk Salaries, FORTUNE (Mar. 21, 2015),  
http://fortune.com/2015/03/21/college-basketball-coaches-and-their-slam-dunk-salaries/ 
(stating that “experienced and winning coaches get CEO-sized compensation”). 
80 Amy Daughters, Why We Would Never Be a College Football Head Coach, BLEACHER 
REP. (May 5, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1629795-why-we-would-never-be-a 
-college-football-head-coach (stating that, on average, college football coaches work 100 
hours a week during the season). 
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can also earn a great deal doing television, radio, footwear, and apparel 
endorsements, thereby supplementing their incomes handsomely.81 
In addition to coaches, athletic directors can also receive a hefty 
remuneration, with some making over a million dollars annually.82 In 
a report by USA Today in 2013, all the reported athletic director salaries 
ranged from six to seven figures.83 Athletic Director Paul Krebs of New 
Mexico, a non-Power Five conference school, made $408,391 in salary 
with a maximum potential bonus of $70,000 based on the performance 
of the athletic department.84 A Power Five conference Athletic 
Director, Jeremy Foley of Florida, made $1,233,250 in salary with a 
potential bonus of $50,000.85 
Athletic departments also spend millions on facilities to attract the 
top college athletes.86 The NCAA places no limit on how much a 
school can spend on its facilities.87 In the fall of 2015, Kansas State 
finished its new football facility that cost $68 million.88 Extravagant 
spending on sports facilities is not limited to Power Five conference 
schools. Even Rice University is investing over $30 million in building 
a sports facility.89 These grandiose facilities, including Rice’s, 
 
81 See Erik Brady, Steve Berkowitz & Christopher Schnaars, College Football Salaries: 
How Georgia’s Mark Richt Makes Millions, USA TODAY (July 2, 2015, 12:45 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/11/19/mark-richt-georgia-college-foot 
ball-coaches-salaries-compensation/19246795. 
82 Athletic Director Salary Database: 2013 Athletic Directors’ Salaries, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 6, 2013, 6:11 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/03/06 
/athletic-director-salary-database-methodology/1968783. 




86 Bilas Interview, supra note 17. 
87 See, e.g., O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 978–79 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (noting 
that colleges and universities “are able to spend freely” in certain areas, including training 
facilities, and the “NCAA does not do anything to rein in [this] spending.”); Bilas Interview, 
supra note 17 (recognizing that there is no cap on what universities and colleges can spend 
on facilities). 
88 See K-State Football Announces Plans for Next Bill Snyder Family Stadium Project: 
Next Phase Will Enclose Wildcats’ Football Facility, CJONLINE (Sept. 9, 2015, 10:19 AM), 
http://cjonline.com/sports/catzone/2015-09-09/k-state-football-announces-plans-next-bill   
-snyder-family-stadium-project (“K-State had the grand opening of the $68 million . . . 
[c]omplex last week, and the next phase of the stadium improvements has a $15 million 
price tag.”). 
89 Rice Holds Ceremonial Groundbreaking for New Brian Patterson Sports Performance 
Center: Opens in 2016, RICE OWLS (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.riceowls.com/genrel/0310 
15aab.html. 
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typically include gaudy locker rooms.90 The University of Alabama’s 
football locker room flaunts amenities such as video arcade games, 
pool tables, two 30-foot-long hot tubs, and televisions throughout the 
facility, including in the pool area.91 
To the extent these facilities and locker rooms serve as recruiting 
tools for college athletes, they also serve as forms of indirect 
compensation that the schools cannot pay directly because of NCAA 
rules.92 Indirect pay as a means of recruitment demonstrates that the 
players’ market values are higher than the scholarship amounts.93 
Improving football and basketball facilities also demonstrates to 
Power Five conferences that the school making those improvements 
maintains a commitment to major college athletics. A school on the 
outside of those major conferences may seek an invitation to a Power 
Five conference to share in the revenues generated from television 
deals, bowl games, and NCAA tournament success. Schools may claim 
that the new facilities are for the college athletes, which is true to a 
certain extent. Schools though, also want a piece of the bigger pie from 
major college sports, which in turn motivates athletic departments and 
schools to build these facilities. 
 
90 See id. (stating the two-story structure will house a weight room, a home-team locker 
room, coaching and staff offices, an auditorium that will seat 150 people, a football team 
lounge, and areas for training and sports medicine that include hydrotherapy, plunge pools, 
and exam rooms). 
91 See University of Alabama’s $9m Facility Is like Something out of MTV Cribs, THE 42 
(July 22, 2013, 9:47 PM), http://www.the42.ie/university-of-alabamas-9m-facility-is-like -
something-out-mtv-cribs-1004290-Jul2013 (stating that these “shiny new facilities [are] a 
huge recruiting tool” and by pulling in “$82 million in football revenue,” the University of 
Alabama can afford it). 
92 Cf. Solomon, supra note 13 (showing the amount the four College Playoff teams spent 
on recruiting in 2015: Alabama spent $1.3 million; Oklahoma spent $881,000; Clemson 
spent $694,000; and Michigan State spent $648,000. The table also provides, via CBS 
Sports, USA Today, and the Portland Business Journal, information concerning how each 
2015 Playoff team receives/spends its money on: Total Operating Athletic Revenue, 
Sports/Scholarship Athletes, Annual Debt for Athletic Facilities, Approximate Cost of 
Attendance (Stipend to Players), Football Ticket Sales, Donations to Athletic Department, 
Direct Institutional Support, Student Fee Revenue, NCAA/Conference Payouts, Broadcast, 
TV, Radio, and Internet Rights, Football Camp Revenue, Nike 2015–16 Contract value, 
Total Operating Athletic Expenses, Football Coach Pay in 2015–16, Football Assistant 
Coaches Pay, Football Support Staff Pay, Football Recruiting Expenses, Athletic 
Department Medical Expenses/Insurance); see also NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at bylaw 
13. 
93 See Mark Koba, What a College Athlete Is Worth on the Open Market, CNBC (Apr. 
12, 2014, 9:02 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/12/whats-a-college-athlete-worth-in      
-pay-on-the-open-market.html (indicating that the bidding war for athletes would likely be 
in the millions). 
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Although most athletic departments report higher expenses than 
revenues, the massive revenues provide for the coaches’ lofty salaries 
and the facilities’ high costs. During “2013, FBS athletic programs 
generated median revenues of $41,897,000, independent of allocated 
sources,” while “[t]he median of total expenses for FBS athletics 
departments in 2013 was $62,227,000,” with “total expenses 
exceed[ing] generated revenues by $11,623,000.”94 Most of the 
revenues came “from ticket sales (26 percent), contributions from 
alumni and others (25 percent), and distributions from the NCAA and 
each institutions’ respective conference (24 percent).”95 In 2013, 103 
FBS athletics programs in total “reported negative net generated 
revenues (expenses exceeded generated revenue),” while “[o]nly 20 
programs reported positive net generated revenues (generated revenue 
exceeded expenses).”96 However, a $23 million gap existed “between 
profitable programs and others, illustrating the larger variation between 
athletic budgets in the FBS.”97 Moreover, “[c]olleges are generally not-
for-profit, and therefore, excess funds tend to get spent (since an owner 
can’t claim these profits),” meaning there is an incentive to spend all 
of the money coming into the program.98 
The Power Five conference school revenues are “five times greater 
than the revenues of these mid-major institutions,” which stem 
primarily from the extraordinary differences in ticket sales, rights, and 
licensing.99 The annual ticket revenue for the athletic department at the 
University of Texas, for example, brings in almost one hundred times 
the revenue of the athletic department at Troy University.100 
Almost every college sports program, other than football and men’s 
basketball, produces losses for the athletic department.101 Many small 
schools schedule football games with opponents from larger schools. 
The smaller schools play opponents at the larger school’s home field, 
 
94 Gould IV, Wong & Weitz, supra note 1, at 16–17. 
95 Id. at 16. 
96 Id. at 18. 
97 Id. 
98 Dave Berri, How About a Free Market for College Athletes?, FREAKONOMICS (Mar. 
22, 2013, 9:36 AM), http://freakonomics.com/2013/03/22/how-about-a-free-market-for        
-college-athletes. 
99 Gould IV, Wong & Weitz, supra note 1, at 21. 
100 Id. at 20–21. 
101 Randy Chua, How Much Revenue Do College Sports Produce?, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 
15, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/1111/how-much-revenue 
-do-college-sports-produce.aspx. 
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and the teams split the revenue from the ticket sales.102 This benefits 
the larger schools because they can schedule a team that might be less 
challenging to defeat than other teams in their own conference or 
comparable conferences.103 The smaller programs benefit because they 
generate a great deal of money for their programs and their schools’ 
other sports.104 
Confession: I Actually Believed My Rice Football Team Could Beat 
Ohio State 
I recall being told that our football program was the only program 
that made money, and that our program helped substantially to pay for 
Rice’s other athletic programs, despite the on-field success of our other 
athletic programs—particularly baseball, which was ranked 
nationally. 
Rice football generated revenue, in large part, due to the games we 
scheduled against larger schools. Prior to playing in these contests, I 
viewed these matchups as an opportunity to play against the best 
competition and raise the profile of our football program. After playing 
in these match-ups and serving as a sacrificial lamb in front of tens of 
thousands of people, the only thing I accomplished was losing an 
incredible amount of pride. For example, we went to the “Horseshoe” 
in 1996 and held Ohio State University to seventy points, while scoring 
a stellar seven points on the home team. Once I later became aware of 
why teams like Rice play Ohio State—to generate money to support the 
school’s entire athletic department—I understood what exploitation of 
the college athlete meant.105 
Athletic departments pay themselves and the coaches, spend millions 
of dollars on facilities, finance unprofitable sports with the earnings 
generated by football and men’s basketball teams, and then assert two 
disingenuous claims: first, the athletic department was not profitable; 
 
102 Alex Mayyasi, The $1 Million Reason College Football Season Starts with Blowouts, 
PRICEONOMICS (Aug. 27, 2013), https://priceonomics.com/the-s1-million-reason-college     
-football-season (discussing the logistics of a smaller school playing a larger school so they 
can split the revenue from those games). 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
105 We were twenty-six or twenty-seven point underdogs in that Ohio State game in 1996, 
and we felt disrespected by the odds-makers. Apparently, the odds-makers respected us a 
lot more than they should have. 
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and, second, if college athletes could theoretically receive 
compensation, there is no money remaining for them.106 
D. The NCAA Forbids College Athletes from Profiting Based on the 
Sport They Play and Use of Their Names, Images, and Likenesses 
The NCAA promulgates and enforces rules for all of its participants. 
Those rules include NCAA Bylaw 12.1.2, which states that a college 
athlete becomes ineligible if one “[u]ses his or her athletics skill 
(directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport.”107 NCAA 
Bylaw 12.5.2.1 prohibits a college athlete from earning compensation 
through endorsing commercial products.108 Thus, college athletes 
cannot receive compensation for playing or for selling their names, 
images, or likenesses.109 
College athletes receive scholarships for tuition, room, board, and 
books. However, “[t]he full cost of attendance is generally between 
$2000 and $5000 per year more than the value of the respective 
school’s athletic scholarship because it accounts for various 
miscellaneous expenses.”110 The full cost of attendance fees at 
Bowling Green, for example, “include[] a tuition fee, miscellaneous 
personal expenses, transportation, loan origination fee and 
administrative fees.”111 Some college athletes qualify for Pell grants, 
which help provide an actual full scholarship, while others do not 
qualify.112 For example, I did not qualify for a Pell grant, but I needed 
 
106 See ANDY SCHWARZ, EXCUSES NOT REASONS: 13 MYTHS ABOUT (NOT) PAYING 
COLLEGE ATHLETES 50–54 (2011), http://sportsgeekonomics.tumblr.com/myths (click on 
PDF link); Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Playing in the Red, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/sports/wp/2015/11/23/running-up-the-bills/. 
107 NCAA BYLAWS, supra note 6, at bylaw 12.1.2(a). 
108 Id. at bylaw 12.5.2(1)(a) (forbidding a college athlete from “[a]ccept[ing] any 
remuneration for or permit[ing] the use of his or her name or picture to advertise, 
recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial product or service of any 
kind”). 
109 See id. at bylaw 15.1 (receiving financial aid that exceeds the cost of attendance 
renders a player ineligible). Predictably, though, the NCAA’s own rules allow the NCAA to 
use a college athlete’s name or picture to “promote NCAA championships or other NCAA 
events, activities or programs.” Id. at bylaw 12.5.1.1.1. 
110 Eric Prisbell, What is Full Cost of Attendance for NCAA Athletes?, USA TODAY 
(Aug. 17, 2014, 5:06 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/08/17/ncaa 
-full-cost-of-attendance/14200387. 
111 Id. 
112 See Travis L. Packer, College Cost Reduction and Access Act: A Good Step, But Only 
a Step, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 221, 225–27 (2008) (discussing the mechanics of Pell 
grants); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing the 
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to travel from my home state of Colorado to Houston, Texas. The 
school did not pay for me to fly or drive home, and when I stayed in 
Houston during two summers to train with the team and take an upper 
level economics class, I needed to find a job to pay for my living 
expenses and meals. 
The autonomy legislation allows schools to fill the gap between the 
grant-in-aid scholarship that most schools provide and the full cost of 
attendance scholarship that would cover the additional $2000 to $5000 
of costs discussed above. Nevertheless, simply paying for all of the 
athlete’s college expenses fails to compensate players fairly at major 
college programs who generate billions of dollars of revenue. 
Some argue that college athletes already receive enough 
compensation through their scholarships, and college athletes also 
receive a clear pathway to professional sports.113 This argument 
accurately depicts a college athlete’s desire to become a professional 
athlete. Despite athletes knowing the odds are stacked against them 
with regard to becoming professionals, most athletes still believe that 
they fall into the minute percentage of athletes that will reach the NFL 
or the NBA.114 Some of that optimism bias might be based on the fact 
that Division I college athletes already represent a select number of 
athletes who made an elite cut. That is, only one percent of high school 
basketball players eventually compete at Division I schools, and just 
2.5% of high school football athletes play at Division I schools.115 In 
any event, an athlete must believe that he can overcome all odds to 
reach his goals, which helps motivate an athlete to train hard every day 
and focus on his sport. 
The argument about a college athlete receiving a clear path to the 
professional ranks, however, fails to address the reality that very few 
 
NCAA allows college athletes to receive Pell grants, even above their cost of attendance 
scholarship amounts, and Pell grants are available to athletes and non-athletes alike). 
113 See, e.g., McCauley, supra note 35 (arguing athletes’ scholarships are sufficient 
compensation for their athletic services and that “the players who are so good and entertain 
us in college will eventually get paid” in the pros). 
114 NCAA, DIVISION I RESULTS FROM THE NCAA GOALS STUDY ON THE STUDENT-
ATHLETE EXPERIENCE 30 (2011), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DI_GOALS_FA 
RA_final_1.pdf (reporting data from a 2010 study that showed seventy-six percent of the 
Division I men’s college basketball players and fifty-eight percent of the FBS players 
responding to a survey thought that it was “at least ‘somewhat likely’” that they would 
become a professional and/or Olympic athlete in their sport). 
115 NCAA, NCAA RESEARCH: ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF COMPETING IN COLLEGE 
ATHLETICS, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Probability%20Chart%20 
Web%20PDF_draft5.pdf (last updated Apr. 13, 2015). 
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college athletes become professional athletes. The percentage of 
college players who are drafted by an NFL or NBA team slightly 
exceeds just one percent.116 If one is drafted by an NFL or NBA team, 
that does not even ensure that the draftee will make the team. Even for 
those who somehow do make a team in the NFL or NBA, the average 
career is approximately three years and five years, respectively.117 
Despite one’s success at the high school and collegiate levels, it 
remains highly unlikely that a college athlete will play professionally. 
And if he does, it is likely that his career as a professional athlete will 
be short-lived. The chance to reach one’s professional sport via a 
college athletics scholarship represents as much a form of 
compensation as does winning the lottery when one acquires a lottery 
ticket. 
Confession: I Truly Thought I Was Going to Play Professional 
Football 
Even as a 5’6,” 150-pound freshman entering Rice, I wanted to—
and believed that I could—reach the NFL. I earned all-state honors in 
high school, and I was eventually inducted into my high school’s 
athletic hall of fame for football. I was recruited by several schools, but 
my final choice came down to Rice—which offered me a full grant-in-
aid scholarship—or Harvard. I eventually chose to play at Rice over 
Harvard because Rice awards full athletic scholarships while Harvard 
does not, and Rice plays in the highest division of college football 
(which was previously Division I and is now the FBS), while Harvard 
does not. I made the leap from high school to Division I football, and I 
felt elite. I believed my professional football career would follow my 
career at Rice. 
My career at Rice, though, included mostly playing backup 
cornerback and kick returner, starting only a few games total (one at 
cornerback and a few at kick returner). I also played special teams, but 
I was no star. Years after playing, I must confess that my chances of 
being drafted by the United States Army heavily outweighed my 
chances of being drafted by an NFL team. 
Most college athletes will not reach the professional ranks of their 
sports, but they should be able to earn compensation for generating 
huge revenues for their colleges. Athletes should also be able to receive 
payment by licensing their names, images, and likenesses during 
college when those commodities possess marketable value. College 
 
116 Id. 
117 Gaines, supra note 37. 
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athletes dedicate so much of their time, energy, and effort to sports that 
they should be compensated for those efforts. Even though they are also 
students, sports come first for college athletes. 
The Northwestern case involved Northwestern University football 
players seeking to form a union to protect their interests.118 
Northwestern included evidence from college athletes where they 
detailed the amount of time they spent dedicated to football and 
academics.119 College athletes dedicated the following time, on 
average, to football: fifty to sixty hours per week during training camp 
prior to school; forty to fifty hours per week during the season; and 
twelve to twenty-five hours per week during the spring semester.120 
These college athletes dedicated twenty hours per week to academics 
in each semester.121 A study done by the NCAA in 2011 provided 
similar results, showing college athletes spent about forty-five hours 
per week for their sport and nearly thirty hours per week toward their 
academics.122 
There is a remarkable duality to college athletes, as the NCAA’s 
phrase “student-athlete” suggests, because of the incredible amount of 
time and energy necessary to succeed in either endeavor, let alone 
both.123 Athletics and academics are connected in that a scholarship 
athlete cannot play football unless he is academically eligible, and he 
 
118 See Nw. Univ., No. 13-RC-121359, 2014–15 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,781 (Mar. 
26, 2014). On appeal, the full NLRB declined to exercise jurisdiction over this matter, 
commenting that it maintains jurisdiction over only private entities, while many of the 
schools competing in the Big Ten conference against Northwestern are public entities. See 
Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 3 (2015). The full Board did not address the issue of 
whether college athletes are employees or primarily athletes. Id. 




122 NCAA, supra note 115; see also Lynn O’Shaughnessy, Do College Athletes Have 
Time to Be Students?, CBS MONEY WATCH (Feb. 18, 2011, 10:56 AM), http://www.cbs 
news.com/news/do-college-athletes-have-time-to-be-students. 
123 Professors Robert and Amy McCormick denounce the term “student-athlete” as a 
myth. They argue that college athletes are employees under the National Labor Relations 
Act and entitled to that act’s protections. Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian 
McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. 
L. REV. 71, 95–97 (2006). The McCormicks contend that the “NCAA utilized the term 
‘student-athlete’ to cloak the actual relationship between the parties. Indeed, the term itself 
was born of the NCAA’s swift and alarmed reaction to a judicial determination in 1953 that 
. . . certain college athletes were employees and entitled to statutory benefits under state 
law.” Id. at 83. 
GRENARDO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2017  3:46 PM 
248 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95, 223 
may not have been given the opportunity to go to that school but for his 
athletic prowess. Nevertheless, the ability to succeed in either realm is 
hindered by the other. Maintaining high grades while playing a sport is 
extremely difficult, as is training for, and participating in, one’s sport 
while having to attend class and study. Even if a college athlete strives 
to attend law school or medical school after playing college sports, he 
must make sure he complies with all of his athletic duties to ensure that 
he graduates.124 The Northwestern case demonstrates that when 
athletics collide with academics, athletics come first—at least in terms 
of the time dedicated to each. 
Confession: Going to College on an Athletic Scholarship is Anything 
but a Free Ride 
Playing football at Rice opened doors for me, and I enjoyed the 
comradery with my teammates and the excitement of the games. 
Nonetheless, the demands placed on scholarship athletes—the struggle 
with the conflict between athletics and academics, and the sentiment 
that college sports is a businessmake being a scholarship athlete 
extremely difficult. 
As a scholarship athlete, if I did not fulfill my athletic obligations to 
the football team—attending meetings, practices, mandatory workouts, 
and games—then I could not attend Rice University. It was extremely 
difficult to try to succeed academically while playing football, and the 
conflict between athletics and academics began almost as soon I 
arrived on campus. 
As a Freshman, one of the first meetings we had with our 
upperclassmen football teammates included a discussion about 
prioritization of academics and athletics. An upperclassman said that 
academics are number one, while holding up two fingers to indicate 
academics are actually number two. He then said that football is 
number two, this time holding up just his index finger to show that 
football should be our number one priority. I wanted to receive a great 
education, which is one of the reasons I went to Rice, but I also wanted 
to play professionally. The conflict between athletics and academics 
began with that first meeting and continued throughout my college 
career. 
I endured a schedule similar to that described above in the 
Northwestern case. Before the fall semester began, we persevered 
through two-a-day practices in the fall in Houston. Two-a-day 
 
124 Id. at 128 n.241 (“[C]ollege athletes may lose their athletic scholarships if they fail to 
perform their athletic services.”). 
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practices involve two long practices (each an hour and a half to two 
hours) in the same day. Playing at Rice meant practicing in 100-degree 
heat with over ninety percent humidity during those two-a-days, 
oftentimes with our helmets and full pads. Coaches mandated that all 
players recorded their weight immediately before and after practice. 
Some large linemen would lose twenty pounds in one two-hour practice 
and would require an I.V. to restore fluids. 
Once school started, we lifted weights in the morning during the 
season, which required waking up around 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. depending 
on one’s lifting group. After lifting in the morning, we ate at mandatory 
training table (meals prepared by on-campus restaurants or local 
restaurants and typically served on-campus for college athletes) for 
breakfast from around 7:00 a.m. to 8:45 a.m. We then attended classes, 
which started around 9:00 a.m. and ended around 1:50 p.m., 
depending on one’s particular schedule. We ate lunch at noon to 12:50 
p.m. If time allowed in between classes, some of my teammates watched 
film of upcoming opponents, lifted weights some more, studied, or 
napped. We then headed to the stadium around 2:30 or 2:45 p.m. to 
dress for practice (i.e., get our ankles taped and put on our practice 
gear) and attend meetings (where we analyzed film of our previous 
game or practice, as well as film of our next opponent, and we learned 
and examined game plans and strategies for the upcoming game). After 
meetings, we practiced until around 6:30 p.m., and then we went to 
mandatory training table from approximately 7:00 p.m. to 8:30 or 9:00 
p.m. After training table and before going to sleep at night, I sometimes 
watched film of opponents to prepare for the game. 
On Fridays, I travelled with the football team during most of the day 
if the opponent was located outside of Texas. When traveling, the 
football team typically visited the opponent’s stadium on Friday 
afternoon for a walk-through, ate dinner and had a meeting at night. 
The next day, we ate breakfast in the morning, and played the game the 
next day in the afternoon or at night. If the game was played at the 
opponent’s stadium, our team might not reach home until late Saturday 
night or early Sunday morning. Even if the football team played at 
home, the football team stayed in a hotel close to the stadium on Friday 
night until the game on Saturday, and the players reported to the hotel 
around 5:00 p.m. on Friday. 
In the spring, we typically lifted in the morning and performed 
intense conditioning and lifting in the afternoon. We also practiced 
three weeks during spring football where we competed for a starting 
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position, and those few weeks mirrored a typical day during the season 
in the fall. Devoting an incredible amount of time to football made it 
difficult to find time to study. 
Not only did the daily schedule create an inherent conflict between 
athletics and academics, but the physical rigors of college football also 
made competing academically even more difficult. For example, 
cornerbacks usually did a drill for ten minutes a day that involved 
shedding (i.e. facing and overcoming) a blocker. We would stand toe-
to-toe with a fellow defensive back who was acting like a wide receiver 
trying to block us. I would initiate contact with my helmet to his helmet, 
simultaneously grab his jersey, then extend my arms and throw him out 
of the way to simulate how one deals with a blocker. Whether I was the 
“hitter” or “hittee” in this daily drill, ramming or receiving a hit to my 
head for ten minutes did not leave me in the best physical or mental 
state to study at 9:00 p.m. once all of my football duties were 
completed.125 
In college, the coaches’ livelihoods depend on how players perform. 
When athletes fail to perform in college and the team loses, coaches 
can get fired. A coach can remind his players that if they do not perform 
on the field, then the coach’s sons and daughters may no longer attend 
that private school or have food to eat if the coach loses his job. 
Perhaps this is not the best way to motivate an eighteen or nineteen-
year-old, but it should become fairly obvious to college athletes, as it 
did to me, that this is much more than just a game, especially to the 
coaches. 
The rigor of being a college athlete at Rice was so difficult that I 
often marveled at the “free time” that I felt like I had while I was in 
law school at Duke University. I came home from my first day of classes 
in law school and incredulously found myself with nothing to do but 
study, as opposed to college where meetings, practice, and a 
mandatory training table awaited after classes. 
Given the incredible demands and pressure that college athletes face 
and the revenue they generate from playing major college sports, courts 
should adopt a free market approach to allow college athletes to reap 
the financial benefits they deserve. 
 
125 The rest of football practice was physically draining as well. I was trying to make it 
to the NFL, and earn as much playing time as I could by performing in meetings and practice, 
which also made the process emotionally draining. 
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II 
THE FREE MARKET APPROACH SHOULD APPLY IN MAJOR COLLEGE 
SPORTS VIA ANTITRUST LAW 
Major college sports operate as a business in a free market system 
for everyone involved, except the athletes.126 Jay Bilas argues that 
“players should not be restricted[;] . . . they should be allowed to 
participate in this college sports market openly and get their fair market 
value like every other person is allowed to do, including every other 
student.”127 The NCAA and its members could institute a salary cap or 
profit sharing system through collective bargaining.128 If not, then “the 
players should be allowed to bargain for their fair market value[s] 
individually in the marketplace . . . . That includes endorsements and 
that includes getting what they want or what they can bargain for from 
a school.”129 Furthermore, “there’s no requirement that coaches be 
paid, and no requirement that coaches be paid millions of dollars. If a 
school wants to pay less, they can. If a school wants to pay more, they 
can . . . . [t]here is no cap on what they can spend on facilities or how 
they can travel, [including the use of] . . . private travel—it’s all up to 
each school to make their own decisions.”130 Each school should 
similarly decide whether it wants to compensate its players or not.131 
This Part discusses the free market approach and antitrust law that 
should enable the creation of a free market system for college athletes. 
This Part also discusses the applicable antitrust law and cases, then 
applies the relevant law to college athlete compensation above their 
scholarships for playing and for the use of their names, images, and 
likenesses. 
A. The Free Market Approach 
A capitalist economy employs free markets that promote 
competition.132 Competition creates “the best prices, highest quality, 
most choices, and best opportunity for innovation.”133 In 1890 
 






132 Matthew J. Gustin, The O’Bannon Court Got It Wrong: The Case Against Paying 
NCAA Student-Athletes, 42 W. STATE U.L. REV. 137, 147 (2015). 
133 Id. 
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Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act to prevent monopolies and 
to preserve competition through free markets.134 
The plaintiffs in Jenkins v. NCAA, a case pending in the Northern 
District of California,135 seek the free market model advocated by Bilas 
and others.136 In Jenkins, attorney Jeffrey Kessler, known for securing 
free agency for players in the NFL,137 filed a class action complaint on 
behalf of several college football and men’s basketball players against 
the NCAA and the Power Five conferences.138 The named plaintiffs 
include “four current top-tier college football and men’s basketball 
players,” and the class includes all similarly situated college 
athletes.139 The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs “are exploited by 
Defendants and their member institutions under false claims of 
amateurism.”140 
The complaint further alleges that the defendants “entered into what 
amounts to cartel agreements with the avowed purpose and effect of 
placing a ceiling on the compensation that may be paid to these athletes 
for their services.”141 The Jenkins complaint employs an antitrust 
approach to advocate market value compensation for college 
athletes.142 
 
134 See The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice 
/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
135 In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 24 F. Supp. 3d 1366 
(J.P.M.L. 2014) (transferring the case from the District of New Jersey to the Northern 
District of California by a multidistrict litigation panel because of the other antitrust cases 
against the NCAA that were already pending in the Northern District of California). 
136 See, e.g., Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and a 
Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2363–64 (2014) 
(advocating for a free market system to compensate college athletes); Lee Goldman, Sports 
and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 208 
(1990); Andy Schwarz & Dan Rascher, Opposing View: College Sports Should Work as a 
Free Market, USA TODAY (Jan. 12, 2012, 11:33 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com 
/news/opinion/story/2012-01-12/college-football-free-market/52524448/1. 
137 Aaron Vehling, Titans of The Plaintiffs Bar: Jeffrey Kessler, LAW 360 (Oct. 16, 2014, 
2:01 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/586308/titans-of-the-plaintiffs-bar-jeffrey-kess 
ler. 
138 Complaint and Jury Demand-Class Action Seeking Injunction and Individual 
Damages, Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 3:33-av-0001 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) [hereinafter 
Complaint]. 
139 Id. at 2–3. 
140 Id. at 2. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. (asserting that the “restrictions are pernicious, a blatant violation of the antitrust 
laws, have no legitimate pro-competitive justification, and should now be struck down and 
enjoined”). 
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B. The Sherman Act and Relevant Antitrust Law 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal to form any “contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States.”143 As every contract restrains trade to some extent, 
“the Supreme Court has limited the restrictions contained in section 1 
to bar only ‘unreasonable restraints of trade.’”144 
To prevail on a claim under this section, a plaintiff must show “(1) 
that there was a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) that the 
agreement unreasonably restrained trade under either a per se rule of 
illegality or a rule of reason analysis; and, (3) that the restraint affected 
interstate commerce.”145 
1. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and the 
Rule of Reason Analysis 
In the seminal 1984 case of National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (Board of 
Regents), the United States Supreme Court applied antitrust law to the 
NCAA and major college sports.146 The Supreme Court held against 
the NCAA,147 when previously the courts “took a hands-off approach 
when it came to the NCAA, and were dismissive of the alleged 
violations of antitrust laws pertaining to the NCAA’s noncommercial 
objectives.”148 
Board of Regents involved the NCAA’s rules for televising college 
football games.149 The rules capped both the total number of college 
games that could be televised each year as well as the number of games 
that any particular school’s team could appear on television.150 Schools 
also needed approval from the NCAA to enter into an agreement with 
 
143 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
144 Law v. NCAA (NCAA), 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing NCAA v. Bd. 
of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984)); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 
52–60 (1911). 
145 Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hairston v. 
Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
146 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
147 Id. at 120. 
148 Andrew B. Carrabis, Strange Bedfellows: How the NCAA and EA Sports May Have 
Violated Antitrust and Right of Publicity Laws to Make a Profit at the Exploitation of 
Intercollegiate Amateurism, 15 BARRY L. REV. 17, 24 (2010). 
149 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88. 
150 Id. at 94. 
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the television networks to broadcast the games.151 The University of 
Oklahoma and the University of Georgia sued the NCAA arguing that 
these restrictions constituted illegal restraints of trade under Section 1 
of the Sherman Act.152 
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the NCAA’s 
television rules represented two types of agreements that are typically 
considered per se unlawful153 when addressing horizontal competitors 
in the same market: (1) a price-fixing agreement (because the NCAA 
television rules designated a “minimum aggregate price” that networks 
were required to pay the schools, which prevented price negotiation 
between the networks and the schools), and (2) output limitation 
(because the rules “restrain[ed] the quantity of television rights 
available for sale”).154 The Court concluded, however, that application 
of the per se rule would be “inappropriate” because college football is 
“an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential 
if the product is to be available at all.”155 The NCAA product is 
competition itself—competition between member institution teams—
that requires rules that apply to all member institutions to ensure that 
competition.156 As a result, the Court determined that a rule of reason 
analysis applied.157 
A rule of reason analysis involves a burden-shifting test where the 
plaintiff “bears the initial burden of showing that an agreement had a 
substantially adverse effect on competition.”158 A plaintiff can show 
the “anticompetitive effect [of a challenged restriction] indirectly by 
 
151 Id. at 106. 
152 Id. at 88. 
153 The per se rule condemns practices that “are entirely void of redeeming competitive 
rationales.” Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998). “Once a practice is 
identified as illegal per se, a court need not examine the practice’s impact on the market or 
the procompetitive justifications for the practice advanced by a defendant before finding a 
violation of antitrust law.” Id. “Horizontal price fixing and output limitation are ordinarily 
condemned as a matter of law under an ‘illegal per se’ approach because the probability that 
these practices are anticompetitive is so high; a per se rule is applied ‘when the practice 
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition 
and decrease output.’” Id. at 1017 (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100–01). An analysis 
of the particular market context is thus not required in this situation. 
154 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99–100. 
155 Id. at 100–01. 
156 See id. at 88. 
157 Id. at 103. 
158 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019 (citing Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 
56 (2d Cir. 1997); Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Orson Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
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proving that the defendant possessed the requisite market power within 
a defined market or directly by showing actual anticompetitive effects, 
such as control over output or price.”159 If the plaintiff demonstrates an 
anticompetitive effect, then a heavy burden shifts to the defendant to 
establish a procompetitive justification of the challenged restraint for 
the deviation from the free market.160 The defendant must provide only 
legitimate procompetitive justifications that, on balance, actually show 
“the challenged restraint enhances competition.”161 For example, 
“mere profitability or cost savings have not qualified as a defense under 
the antitrust laws.”162 
If the defendant satisfies its burden, then the plaintiff “must prove 
that the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the 
legitimate objectives or that those objectives can be achieved in a 
substantially less restrictive manner.”163 Once each of “these steps are 
met, the harms and benefits must be weighed against each other in order 
to judge whether the challenged behavior is, on balance, 
reasonable.”164 
Courts also sometimes use a quick-look approach under the rule of 
reason.165 If the challenged restraint involves an obvious 
anticompetitive effect, such as an agreement not to compete in terms of 
price (price-fixing) or output, then “the court is justified in proceeding 
 
159 Law, 134 F.3d at 1019 (citing Orson, 79 F.3d at 1367; Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668–
69; Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir.1991)); see, e.g., Fortner 
Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969) (defining “market power” as “the 
ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output”); Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 
335 (7th Cir. 2012) (defining “market power” as “the ability to raise prices significantly 
without going out of business”). 
160 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113. Legitimate procompetitive objectives include 
“lowering transaction costs, and facilitating other output-promoting transactions,” as well 
as “increasing output, creating operating efficiencies . . . enhancing product or service 
quality, and widening consumer choice.” Moyer, supra note 30, at 784–85 (quoting 
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN 
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 207–08 (2d ed. 
2008)). 
161 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104. 
162 Law, 134 F.3d at 1023. Procompetitive justifications require actual evidence, while 
“[s]peculative, unsubstantiated, or uncertain claims of efficiency generally will be deemed 
insufficient to refute evidence of anticompetitive effects.” Moyer, supra note 30, at 786 
(quoting Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern 
Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2012)). 
163 Law, 134 F.3d at 1019; see Clorox, 117 F.3d at 56; Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319; Orson, 
79 F.3d at 1368; Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669. 
164 Law, 134 F.3d at 1019. 
165 Id. at 1020. 
GRENARDO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2017  3:46 PM 
256 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95, 223 
directly to the question of whether the procompetitive justifications 
advanced for the restraint outweigh the anticompetitive effects under a 
‘quick look’ rule of reason.”166 
In applying the rule of reason, the Board of Regents Court found that 
the NCAA’s television rules restrained price and output that resulted in 
significant anticompetitive effects.167 As the district court found, “if 
member institutions were free to sell television rights, many more 
games would be shown on television, and that the NCAA’s output 
restriction has the effect of raising the price the networks pay for 
television rights.”168 Also, “by fixing a price for television rights to all 
games, the NCAA creates a price structure that is unresponsive to 
viewer demand and unrelated to the prices that would prevail in a 
competitive market.”169 Because each school needed approval by the 
NCAA to enter into television agreements, they were required to abide 
by the NCAA’s television rules, which deprived each school of its 
“freedom to compete.”170 
The Supreme Court then found that the restrictive television rules 
failed to serve a procompetitive justification.171 The Court also found 
that the NCAA’s television rules were “not even arguably tailored to 
serve” the purported procompetitive justification of maintaining 
competitive balance amongst the college teams.172 The NCAA 
television rules failed to “regulate the amount of money that any 
college [could] spend on its football program, nor the way in which the 
colleges [could] use the revenues that are generated by their football 
programs,” but “simply impose[d] a restriction on one source of 
revenue that is more important to some colleges than to others.”173 The 
Supreme Court also placed great significance on the “District Court’s  
. . . well-supported finding that many more games would be televised 
in a free market than under the NCAA plan,” which demonstrated that 
the NCAA’s television rules did “not . . . serve any such legitimate 
 
166 Id. 
167 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113. 
168 Id. at 105. 
169 Id. at 106. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 119. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
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purpose.”174 Thus, the Court held that the NCAA’s television rules 
violated the Sherman Act and struck them down.175 
The Board of Regents’ finding that college football would be much 
more prevalent on television without the NCAA’s rules turned out to 
be an incredible understatement. College football is now shown on 
multiple channels throughout the entire day on Saturdays in the fall.176 
College football even appears on live television (at different times 
throughout the season) on weekdays.177 The individual schools and 
conferences compete fiercely for television rights and make significant 
revenues from those deals. For example, Notre Dame holds an 
exclusive deal with NBC for its home games while the University of 
Texas enjoys its very own Longhorn Network, with each school 
reportedly making $15 million annually on these television deals.178 
2. O’Bannon v. NCAA 
The O’Bannon v. NCAA case provides some guidance here as it 
analyzed the NCAA’s compensation rules—i.e., the NCAA’s rules 
prohibiting college athletes from receiving compensation—through 
antitrust analysis. Also, although the plaintiffs in O’Bannon sought 
 
174 Id. at 119–20. 
175 Id. at 120. 
176 See College Football Schedules, CBSSPORTS.COM, http://www.cbssports.com 
/collegefootball/schedules (last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (providing stats for every college 
football team, including the TV station on which the game appeared); FBS (I-A) Schedule—
2015, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/college-football/schedule/_/seasontype/2 (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2016) (showing the results of over 100 college teams that played on the first week 
of the 2015 season); 2015 College Football TV schedule, USA TODAY  (Dec. 18, 2015, 
1:41 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2015/06/02/college-football-tv-
guide-sched ule-fbs-2015/26525745/ (showing the 2015 bowl schedule, including the 
channels for each game, featuring ESPN, CBS, and ABC). 
177 2015 College Football Schedule: FBS (I-A), Week 1, FOXSPORTS, http://www 
.foxsports.com/college-football/schedule?season=2015&seasonType=1&week=1&group 
=-3 (last visited Oct. 28, 2016) (providing the details for the first week of the 2015 College 
Football season, specifically showing that a game was played every day from Thursday 
through Monday). 
178 NBC’s Notre Dame Deal Extended, ESPN (Apr. 18, 2013), http://espn.go.com 
/college-football/story/_/id/9186897/nbc-extends-notre-dame-fighting-irish-football-deal    
-2025 (showing the financial details between Notre Dame and NBC’s contract); Steven 
Godfrey, Longhorn Network Doomed? Texas’ TV Money Stacking Up Fine Against SEC’s, 
SBNATION.COM (June 5, 2015, 12:29 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2015 
/6/5/8733131/texas-longhorn-network-money-revenue (explaining the financial details 
regarding the Longhorn Network); Clay Travis, Every SEC School Will Make More TV 
Money Than Texas, Notre Dame, FOXSPORTS (July 23, 2014, 10:57 AM), http://www.fox 
sports.com/college-football/outkick-the-coverage/every-sec-school-will-make-more-tv        
-money-than-texas-notre-dame-072314. 
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relief for group licensing in videogames, live game telecasts, re-
broadcasts, and archival game footage,179 the arguments are quite 
similar to individual college athletes licensing their names, images, and 
likenesses as discussed in this Article. In O’Bannon, plaintiffs 
challenged the Defendant NCAA’s set of rules that preclude FBS 
football players and Division I men’s basketball players from receiving 
any compensation beyond the fixed value of their scholarships, 
specifically for the use of their names, images, and likenesses.180 
The district court held that the NCAA’s compensation rules 
constituted unlawful restraints of trade under the Sherman Act and 
permanently enjoined the NCAA from preventing its member schools 
from providing full cost of attendance scholarships.181 The district 
court also ruled that the NCAA could not prohibit its members schools 
from setting aside $5000 per athlete per year that would be put in trust 
while the athlete was in school and become available to him after 
graduation.182 A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s order regarding the NCAA’s violation of the Sherman 
Act and the allowance of full cost of attendance scholarships; but, it 
vacated the portion of the permanent injunction that required the 
NCAA to permit member schools to pay athletes deferred 
compensation up to $5000 per year because those expenses were 
“untethered to educational expenses.”183 
Per Board of Regents, both the district court and Ninth Circuit 
applied the rule of reason analysis in O’Bannon.184 Beginning with 
plaintiffs’ initial burden, the district court found, and the Ninth Circuit 
agreed, that the NCAA’s rules prohibiting compensation to college 
athletes for the use of their names, images, and likenesses constituted a 
significant anticompetitive effect on the college education market—a 
market where “colleges compete for the services of athletic recruits by 
offering them scholarships and various amenities, such as coaching and 
 
179 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
180 See id. 
181 See id. at 1007–08. 
182 Id. at 1008. 
183 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs’ request for 
the Ninth Circuit to rehear the appeal en banc was denied. Order Denying Rehearing En 
Banc, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No.14-16601 (9th Cir. 2015). The United States Supreme Court 
later denied both the plaintiffs’ petition and also the NCAA’s petition to review the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied 85 
U.S.L.W. 3139, No. 15-1388 (Oct. 3, 2016) (denying NCAA’s petition for writ of certiorari). 
184 See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070 (“Like the district court,” the Ninth Circuit applied 
the rule of reason). 
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facilities.”185 But for the NCAA’s rules, colleges and universities 
would compete with each other to obtain the services of college 
athletes, which would include paying the college athletes for their 
names, images, and likenesses.186 As a result, the NCAA’s prohibition 
amounts to price-fixing because the schools agree to pay nothing for 
the use of the college athletes’ names, images, and likenesses.187 Also, 
“[a]bsent the NCAA’s compensation rules, video game makers would 
negotiate with student-athletes for the right to use their [names, images, 
and likenesses].”188 Thus, the NCAA’s compensation rules constitute 
a significant anticompetitive restraint.189 
As the plaintiffs satisfied their initial burden under the rule of reason 
analysis, the O’Bannon courts focused on the defendant’s burden to 
show procompetitive justifications for their restriction on college 
athlete compensation.190 In the district court, the NCAA advanced four 
purported procompetitive justifications—amateurism, integrating 
athletics and education, maintaining competitive equity, and increasing 
output—each of which are addressed below. The district court accepted 
the first two justifications, but found that the compensation rules “play 
a limited role in integrating student-athletes with their schools’ 
academic communities.”191 The Ninth Circuit also accepted the first 
two procompetitive justifications, namely “integrating academics with 
athletics,” and “preserving the popularity of the NCAA’s product by 
promoting its current understanding of amateurism,” and did not 
address the other two justifications because the NCAA failed to show 
that the district court’s findings on those justifications were clearly in 
error.192 
Turning to the last part of the rule of reason analysis, the district 
court identified two less restrictive alternatives: “(1) allowing NCAA 
member schools to give student-athletes grants-in-aid that cover the full 
cost of attendance; and (2) allowing member schools to pay student-
athletes small amounts of deferred cash compensation for use of their 
 
185 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070. 
186 See id. at 1052–53. 
187 Id. at 1069. 
188 Id. at 1067. 
189 Id. at 1072. 
190 See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072–74. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 1073. 
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[names, images, and likenesses].”193 The Ninth Circuit held “that the 
district court did not clearly err in finding that raising the grant-in-aid 
cap would be a substantially less restrictive alternative, but that it 
clearly erred when it found that allowing students to be paid 
compensation for their [names, images, and likenesses] is virtually as 
effective as the NCAA’s current amateur-status rule.”194 The Ninth 
Circuit refused to allow college athletes to receive compensation above 
the full cost of attendance, reasoning that compensation tied to college 
athletes’ educational expenses is vastly different from compensation 
for college athletes “untethered” to educational expenses.195 
In O’Bannon, the district court and Ninth Circuit analyzed the 
procompetitive justifications of the antitrust analysis in detail. That 
analysis is described below. 
a. Amateurism 
In O’Bannon, the district court heavily criticized the NCAA’s use of 
amateurism as a procompetitive justification.196 Judge Wilken of the 
Northern District of California found that “the NCAA has revised its 
rules governing student-athlete compensation numerous times over the 
years, sometimes in significant and contradictory ways.”197 Judge 
Wilken noted that the NCAA’s “current rules demonstrate that, even 
today, the NCAA does not consistently adhere to a single definition of 
amateurism.”198 Judge Wilken provided specific instances of 
inconsistency as she attacked the NCAA’s purported amateurism 
principle: 
A Division I tennis recruit can preserve his amateur status even if he 
accepts ten thousand dollars in prize money the year before he enrolls 
in college. A Division I track and field recruit, however, would forfeit 
his athletic eligibility if he did the same. Similarly, an FBS football 
player may maintain his amateur status if he accepts a Pell grant that 
brings his total financial aid package above the cost of attendance. 
But the same football player would no longer be an amateur if he 
were to decline the Pell grant and, instead, receive an equivalent sum 
of money from his school for the use of his name, image, and likeness 
during live game telecasts.199 
 
193 Id. at 1074. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 1078. 
196 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999–1005 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
197 Id. at 1000. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
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The district court concluded “[s]uch inconsistencies are not indicative 
of “core principles.”200 
The district court mentioned, nevertheless, that “some restrictions 
on compensation may still serve a limited procompetitive purpose if 
they are necessary to maintain the popularity of FBS football and 
Division I basketball,” but it found there were less restrictive means to 
achieve this procompetitive justification.201 
To bolster its case in O’Bannon, the NCAA commissioned a study 
to attempt to show that Americans generally oppose paying college 
athletes.202 As an initial matter, the district court determined that the 
NCAA’s study was unpersuasive because, among other reasons, “the 
survey’s initial question skewed the results by priming respondents to 
think about illicit payments to student-athletes rather than the 
possibility of allowing athletes to be paid.”203 Moreover, that study is 
belied by the fact that similar surveys (one regarding major league 
baseball player salaries and the other concerning professional athletes 
in the Olympics) conducted in the past about consumer behavior turned 
out to be false. Dr. Daniel Rascher, testifying as an expert witness for 
the plaintiffs, explained that despite consumers surveyed opposing both 
the impending rise in baseball players’ salaries in the 1970’s and also 
professional athletes eventually competing in the Olympics, viewership 
actually increased once the players’ salaries rose and professional 
athletes started to compete in the Olympics.204 
The Ninth Circuit, nevertheless, concluded “that there is a concrete 
procompetitive effect in the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism: 
namely, that the amateur nature of collegiate sports increases their 
appeal to consumers.”205 The Ninth Circuit also emphasized that “not 
paying student-athletes is precisely what makes them amateurs.”206 
 
200 Id. Thus, the NCAA apparently deems taxpayer funded aid, such as Pell grants, to 
college athletes acceptable, but not wealth generated by the athlete’s hard work and success. 
See id.; O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078 n.4 (recognizing the NCAA allows college athletes to 
receive Pell grants, even above their cost of attendance scholarship amounts). 
201 Id. (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) and recognizing that 
“‘maximiz[ing] consumer demand for the product’ is a legitimate procompetitive 
justification”). 
202 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015). 
203 Id. 
204 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000; see also O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1081 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
205 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073. 
206 Id. at 1076. 
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The court quoted Board of Regents, arguing that amateurism allows the 
“market for college football” to remain “distinct from other sports 
markets and must be ‘differentiate[d]’ from professional sports lest it 
become ‘minor league [football].’”207 
b. Integrating Athletics and Academics 
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit also accepted as procompetitive the 
justification that athletics and academics need to remain integrated. 
Specifically, compensation rules “prohibiting student-athletes from 
being paid large sums of money not available to ordinary students . . . 
prevent the creation of a social ‘wedge’ between student-athletes and 
the rest of the student body.”208 The Ninth Circuit also accepted the 
district court’s finding, though, that the compensation rules “play a 
limited role in integrating student-athletes with their schools’ academic 
communities.”209 
c. Competitive Equity or Balance 
The next purported procompetitive justification advanced by the 
NCAA in O’Bannon entailed maintaining competitive equity; this 
justification failed.210 The district court’s ruling noted, “[l]ittle 
evidence supports the claim that NCAA regulations help level the 
playing field. At best, they appear to have had a very limited effect, and 
at worst they have served to strengthen the position of the dominant 
teams.”211 Schools engage in an arms race by “invest[ing] more heavily 
in their recruiting efforts, athletic facilities, dorms, coaching, and other 
amenities designed to attract the top student-athletes.”212 This “‘arms 
race,’ has likely negated whatever equalizing effect the NCAA’s 
restraints on student-athlete compensation might have once had on 
competitive balance.”213 Thus, this procompetitive justification failed 
in the district court, and the Ninth Circuit accepted the district court’s 
finding. 
 
207 Id. at 1076–77. 
208 Id. at 1060. 
209 Id. at 1072. 
210 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2014); O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 
at 1072. 
211 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1002. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
GRENARDO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2017  3:46 PM 
2016] The Continued Exploitation of the College Athlete: Confessions 263 
of a Former College Athlete Turned Law Professor 
d. Increasing Output 
Finally, the NCAA argued that increasing output constituted a 
legitimate procompetitive justification, but this argument failed in 
O’Bannon as well. The purported increased output justification 
provides that “restrictions on student-athlete compensation increase the 
number of opportunities for schools and student-athletes to participate 
in Division I sports, which ultimately increases the number of FBS 
football and Division I basketball games played.”214 The district court 
correctly rejected this purported justification for a number of 
reasons.215 First, schools do not choose to compete in the NCAA 
because of a “philosophical commitment to amateurism.”216 The 
autonomy achieved by the Power Five conferences “suggest[s] that 
many current Division I schools are committed neither to the NCAA’s 
current restrictions on student-athlete compensation nor to the idea that 
all Division I schools must award scholarships of the same value.”217 
Second, the NCAA’s current rules do not “enable some schools to 
participate in Division I that otherwise could not afford to do so.”218 
For example, “[n]either the NCAA nor its member conferences require 
high-revenue schools to subsidize FBS football or Division I basketball 
teams at lower-revenue schools. Thus, to the extent schools achieve any 
cost savings by not paying their student-athletes, there is no evidence 
that those cost savings are being used to fund additional teams or 
scholarships.”219 As a result, “[s]chools that cannot afford to re-
allocate any portion of their athletic budget for this purpose would not 
be forced to do so.”220 An athletic program that could not afford to pay 
college athletes, need not do so, and there is no indication that such a 
program would leave Division I or the FBS.221 Many schools pay their 
coaches large salaries and incur increasing expenses to ramp up 
training facilities for college athletes, which indicates that these schools 
would be able to share a limited amount of revenue generated by 
licensing with college athletes.222 Increased output also failed as an 
 
214 Id. at 1003–04. 





220 Id.; see Bilas Interview, supra note 17. 
221 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1004. 
222 Id. 
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alleged procompetitive justification in the district court, and the Ninth 
Circuit did not disturb that sound finding.223 
3. Law v. NCAA 
In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit found that the NCAA’s rules 
governing what compensation college athletes can receive from 
schools relates to the NCAA’s product of college football and 
basketball because “the labor of student-athletes is an integral and 
essential component of the NCAA’s ‘product.’”224 The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that the NCAA’s compensation rules for athletes are similar 
to its rules relating to coaches’ compensation, citing Law v. NCAA.225 
Law v. NCAA provides an instructive antitrust analysis for college 
athlete compensation as Law dealt with the NCAA’s arbitrary 
compensation cap on assistant, entry-level coaches’ salaries.226 In Law, 
plaintiffs were college assistant coaches who claimed that the NCAA 
rule capping their compensation at $16,000 restrained trade in a “labor 
market for coaching services.”227 The court in Law agreed and struck 
down the restriction.228 
The court found that the NCAA’s rule capping the salaries (Cap 
Rule) constituted an agreement to lower these coaches’ salaries 
artificially.229 The court also found an anticompetitive effect because 
the Cap Rule reduced the part-time coaches’ salaries, over $60,000 
annually in some cases, by limiting compensation to entry-level 
coaches to $16,000 per year.230 The NCAA did not “dispute that the 
cost-reduction . . . effectively reduced restricted-earnings coaches’ 
salaries.”231 Because the Cap Rule artificially lowered the price of 
coaching services, no further evidence or analysis was required to find 
market power to set prices, and the court, therefore, employed the 
quick-look approach.232 
 
223 See id. at 982. 
224 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015). 
225 Id. 
226 Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Chicago Prof’l Sports 
Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
227 Law, 134 F.3d at 1015. 
228 Id. at 1024. 
229 Id. at 1022. 
230 Id. at 1014. 
231 Id. at 1020. 
232 Id. 
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In Board of Regents (discussed in Part II.B.1 supra), the Supreme 
Court recognized that certain horizontal restraints in college sports are 
those necessary to produce competitive intercollegiate sports.233 In 
Law, the court rejected the NCAA’s procompetitive objectives for the 
salary limits, including its purported objectives to reduce costs and 
maintain competitive equity.234 In rejecting the cost-reduction 
justification, the court stated that cost-cutting by itself is not a valid 
procompetitive justification.235 
The Law court stated that “[r]educing costs for member institutions, 
without more, does not justify the anticompetitive effects” of the Cap 
Rule.236 The court did not need to consider whether cost reductions 
may have been required to “save” intercollegiate athletics and whether 
such an objective served as a legitimate procompetitive end because 
the NCAA present[ed] no evidence that limits on restricted-earning 
coaches’ salaries would be successful in reducing deficits, let alone that 
such reductions were necessary to save college basketball.237 
According to the court, the Cap Rule failed to equalize the overall 
amount of money Division I schools are permitted to spend on their 
basketball programs. There is no reason to think that the money saved 
by a school on the salary of a restricted-earnings coach will not be put 
into another aspect of the school’s basketball program, such as 
equipment or even another coach’s salary, thereby increasing inequity 
in that area.238 
The court in Law stated that the Cap Rule served as “nothing more 
than a cost-cutting measure and . . . the only consideration the NCAA 
gave to competitive balance was simply to structure the rule so as not 
to exacerbate competitive imbalance.”239 The court found that the Cap 
Rule was not directed towards competitive balance and held that the 
 
233 Id. at 1021 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 
(1984)). 
234 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1021–24 (“Lower prices cannot justify a cartel’s control of 
prices charged by suppliers, because the cartel ultimately robs the suppliers of the normal 
fruits of their enterprises.”). 
235 Id. at 1022. 
236 Id. at 1023. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. at 1023 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 118–19 
(1984)). 
239 Law, 134 F.3d at 1024. 
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Cap Rule violated the Sherman Act.240 Therefore, the NCAA cannot 
place a cap on college coaches’ salaries. 
4. Application of the Rule of Reason Analysis to College Athlete 
Compensation for Playing 
This Part applies the rule of reason analysis to compensation for 
college athletes beyond their scholarships. Here, the Jenkins complaint 
demonstrates how college athletes satisfy their initial burden to show 
that the NCAA and member institutions’ capping the compensation for 
all college athletes at the grant-in-aid level, or the full cost of 
attendance, results in a significant anticompetitive effect.241 As an 
initial matter, the cap on college athlete compensation represents 
horizontal price-fixing by the NCAA and its member institutions, 
which would allow a quick-look analysis that skips to the defendants’ 
heavy burden.242 
Even under a full-blown rule of reason analysis, the NCAA’s 
restriction on college athlete compensation clearly produces significant 
anticompetitive effects. The Jenkins complaint defines the relevant 
markets as the “market for . . . [FBS] football player services” and the 
“market for NCAA Division I men’s basketball player services.”243 
The complaint argues that “FBS and D-I men’s basketball programs 
would clearly compete economically with one another for player 
services if not for NCAA and Power Conference restrictions.”244 
College programs already compete for player services in what many 
term an “arms race,” where programs spend millions of dollars on 
“expanded stadiums and arenas, luxury locker rooms and training 
facilities, high-end dorms, and specialized tutoring centers” to attract 
top athletes.245 The competition between schools for athlete services 
would “provide fair compensation to these athletes for the billions of 
dollars in revenue that they help generate.”246 
The NCAA and the Power Five conferences impose restraints that 
“limit[] the remuneration that the [d]efendants’ member institutions 
 
240 Id. 
241 See Complaint, supra note 138, ¶¶ 40, 42–43. 
242 See id.; Law, 134 F.3d at 1020 (allowing courts to use the quick-look rule of reason 
analysis when price-fixing is shown). 
243 Complaint, supra note 138, ¶ 18. 
244 Id. at 26. 
245 Id.; see O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Bilas 
Interview, supra note 17. 
246 Complaint, supra note 138, ¶ 26. 
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may provide to [student-athletes, and these restraints] constitute an 
anticompetitive, horizontal agreement among competitors to fix 
artificially the remuneration for the services of the members of each 
class in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”247 As the NCAA 
rules denying compensation for college athletes above their 
scholarships are anticompetitive, thus satisfying the first step in the 
antitrust analysis, the analysis turns to procompetitive justifications and 
then less restrictive means. 
The procompetitive benefits the NCAA and the Power Five 
conferences will argue include amateurism, integrating athletics and 
education, maintaining competitive equity, and increasing output, just 
as the NCAA did in O’Bannon.248 The NCAA and its member 
institutions may also argue that reducing costs serves as a 
procompetitive justification for the challenged restraint. The purported 
justifications of maintaining competitive equity and increasing output 
should fail for the same reasons they did in the O’Bannon case. The 
amateurism and integration of athletics and academics justifications, 
although discussed above as well, are addressed further below, as is the 
potential argument regarding reducing costs. Each of these purported 
justifications should also fail. 
a. Amateurism 
The amateurism argument relies on the unsound premise that paying 
college athletes would result in less consumer demand. Chief Judge 
Thomas of the Ninth Circuit, in his partial concurrence and partial 
dissent in O’Bannon, acknowledged “that consumer demand typically 
does not decrease when athletes are permitted to receive payment, and 
that this general principle holds true across a wide variety of sports and 
competitive formats.”249 
Moreover, Jay Bilas argues that if the NCAA “felt like people would 
stop watching [college athletics if athletes were paid], then it would 
certainly have an effect with all the professional baseball players that 
are playing college football and college basketball. That has no impact 
whatsoever . . . .”250 Bilas is referring to the fact that college athletes 
can play professionally in the minor leagues in baseball and earn 
 
247 Id. at 39. 
248 See generally O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
249 Id. at 1081 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
250 Bilas Interview, supra note 17. 
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money there while in college, yet they are still eligible to play a 
different sport in college, such as football or basketball, with 
impunity.251 
Furthermore, the purported procompetitive justification that paying 
college athletes would decrease consumer demand flies directly in the 
face of common sense. People watch college football in droves because 
of their affiliation with a school or the town, city, or region in which 
they grew up or live.252 Chris Plonsky, the Athletic Director for 
Women’s Athletics at the University of Texas in Austin, and the 
NCAA’s own witness in O’Bannon, summed up the reality of 
consumer demand and college athletics, “I would venture to say that if 
we [UT] offered a tiddlywinks team, that would somehow be popular 
with some segment of whoever loves our university.”253 Moreover, 
casual sports fans and the general public might tune in even more to 
see if these college players are worth the money they are paid or if the 
quality of the games improves. 
Confession: I Still Hate Tigers 
I witnessed consumer demand of college football firsthand when I 
played football at Rice.  For example, when my Rice team played 
against the LSU Tigers in Baton Rouge in 1995, fans lined up for half 
a mile on the road to the stadium to “greet” our team for our 
walkthrough an entire day before its homecoming game. The fans 
shouted at us and waved signs saying, among other things, “Tigers Eat 
Rice for Dinner.” Those fans were right—LSU beat my Rice team 52 
to 7. If college athletes received compensation above their 
 
251 See Lisa K. Levine, Jeremy Bloom v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and 
the University of Colorado: All Sports Are Created Equal; Some Are Just More Equal than 
Others, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 721, 725 (2006) (stating that the NCAA allows college 
athletes “to compete as professionals in one sport while retaining their amateur status in 
another sport”). 
252 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1082 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
As mentioned above, ESPN even broadcasts spring practice football games given the high 
demand for college football, and over 100,000 attended Ohio State University’s spring 
practice game. See Austin Ward, Ohio State Breaks Own Record for Attendance in Spring 
Game, ESPN (Apr. 16, 2016), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/15217254 
/ohio-state-breaks-own-record-attendance-spring-game; Every SEC Spring Game to Be 
Televised, SEC SPORTS (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.secsports.com/article/15048848 
(reporting that Alabama, Auburn, and Mississippi State was broadcasted by ESPN or 
ESPNU); see also Derek Volner, ESPN3 to Stream Six ACC College Football Spring 
Games, ESPN MEDIA ZONE (Mar. 23, 2016); http://espnmediazone.com/us/press-releases 
/2016/03/espn3-to-stream-six-acc-college-football-spring-games/ (showing that ESPN3 
streamed the spring games for Duke, Kansas, Clemson, Wake Forest, Florida State, Miami, 
Stephen F. Austin, and Georgia Tech). 
253 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
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scholarships, those same obsessed fans would still be waiting well 
before the game to “greet” LSU’s next opponent with the same fervor 
as they always have. Instead of a decrease in consumer demand from 
those crazed college football fans, most of them would likely donate 
their life savings to pay for athletes to play at their schools, which some 
boosters and alumni do covertly already.254 
Bilas and others contend that there is nothing amateur about college 
athletics—“it’s professional in every way,” as everyone except the 
athletes is receiving substantial profits and compensation.255 When the 
NCAA wants to point the courts’ and the public’s attention away from 
the billions of dollars generated from college athletics, the NCAA hides 
behind amateurism. Although the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon accepted 
the justification that amateurism is procompetitive, the next court 
addressing the issue of college athlete compensation should not. 
b. Integrating Athletics and Academics 
In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit also accepted that integrating 
athletics and academics serves as a procompetitive justification. The 
argument for this justification provides “prohibiting student-athletes 
from being paid large sums of money not available to ordinary students 
. . . prevent[s] the creation of a social ‘wedge’ between student-athletes 
and the rest of the student body.”256 This “wedge” argument defies 
reality. A wedge already exists between college athletes and the rest of 
the student body.257 
 
254 See, e.g., David Ubben, Pay-for-Play—the Truth Behind the Myths, ESPN (July 15, 
2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=6735469 (acknowledging boosters 
were caught giving “extra benefits” to football players, and noting some of these benefits 
are alleged to be in the tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars). 
255 Bilas Interview, supra note 17; see McCormick & McCormick, supra note 12, at 496–
97 (stating the NCAA is a $60 billion industry); see also Mitten & Ross, supra note 38, at 
846–47 (discussing the multibillion dollar industry of major college sports); Matthew J. 
Mitten, et. al., Targeted Reform of Commercialized Athletics, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 
787–88 (2010) (discussing the costs of paying for athletes’ scholarships, paying coaches and 
recruiting staff, and the millions of dollars that are generated from gate receipts, broadcast 
revenues, and sponsorships). 
256 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1060. 
257 George Koonce, a former Green Bay Packer and college football player at East 
Carolina, discussed in his doctoral dissertation how college football players can become 
isolated and segregated from the rest of the student body based on, among other things, 
separate housing from other students and the amount of time required for football players to 
participate in sports. See George Earl Koonce, Jr., Role Transition of National Football 
League Retired Athletes: A Grounded Theory Approach, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 249, 
263–67 (2013). 
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Students who are not athletes become conditioned, likely beginning 
in high school, to believe that athletes receive special benefits and 
privileges that other students do not. In college, those real and 
perceived benefits include free tutoring, free athletic apparel from the 
team, free trips to play games, impermissible gifts from alumni and 
boosters, and perhaps improper assistance from professors.258 The 
segregation of athletes from the rest of the student body through 
institutions such as training table and separate study facilities also 
contributes to the existence of this wedge.259 
Another factor that contributes to this wedge is poverty: many 
athletes live below the poverty line while poverty is less prevalent in 
the overall student body.260 Paying athletes would diminish this wedge, 
not contribute to it. Even though a wedge between athletes and non-
athletes exists, there is no indication this wedge would increase if 
college athletes received compensation because “there are professional 
athletes playing college sports right now.”261 Bilas summarizes the 
argument cogently as follows: 
You have professional baseball players that are playing football and 
basketball [in college], and because that’s legal, because you can 
make money playing and accept compensation in a different sport 
and still be amateur in another, nobody is suggesting that somehow 
those professionals have compromised their education or are 
somehow separated from their teammates or the general student 
population by virtue of the fact that they’re professional athletes and 
they’ve made a lot of money, whether they be Olympic athletes or 
 
258 See Steve Delsohn, UNC’s McCants: ‘Just Show Up, Play,’ ESPN, http://espn.go 
.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11036924/former-north-carolina-basketball-star-rashad-mccants    
-says-took-sham-classes (last updated Oct. 22, 2014) (relaying the story of Rashad McCants, 
a former University of North Carolina basketball player who said “he took bogus classes 
designed to keep athletes academically eligible”). When I played at Rice, football players 
were strongly encouraged to take classes before 2:00 p.m. because of our afternoon and 
evening schedules with meetings, practice, and training table. Because we had limited 
classes that we could take, football players registered first for classes. Students that were not 
athletes knew that football players registered first, but they did not know why and assumed 
we were simply receiving special treatment. I did not realize the hostility that some students 
harbored because of this at first, but I later became aware of it. 
259 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 123, at 100–01 (indicating there are academic-
support facilities where football players are required to participate in ten hours of mandatory 
study hall time per week). 
260 See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 12, at 507 (mentioning many college 
athletes live below the poverty line while the NCAA and its members reap billions of dollars 
in revenues). 
261 Bilas Interview, supra note 17. 
GRENARDO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2017  3:46 PM 
2016] The Continued Exploitation of the College Athlete: Confessions 271 
of a Former College Athlete Turned Law Professor 
playing major league baseball, minor league baseball, whatever it 
is.262 
Paying college athletes would not create any more of wedge than 
already exists. Therefore, the next court addressing the issue of whether 
integrating athletics and academics constitutes an acceptable 
procompetitive justification for college athlete compensation above 
their scholarships should reject this weak wedge argument. 
c. Reducing Costs 
Another purported procompetitive justification might include 
reducing member institutions’ costs, which could relate to the cost of 
paying college athlete salaries or the transaction costs to negotiate 
college athlete compensation. These cost arguments should fail as well. 
Taking these in turn, schools may argue that paying college athletes 
will increase their costs. The court in Law, however, already stated that 
reducing costs for member schools (to pay higher salaries for coaches 
in that case) does not constitute a legally cognizable procompetitive 
objective, 263 meaning that the NCAA and schools would lose on this 
argument that the increase in costs of paying college athletes is 
procompetitive. 
The argument that paying college athletes will increase transaction 
costs because the parties will need to negotiate should also fail. 
Universities, some of which employ thousands of people, including 
administrators, professors, and staff, adjust or negotiate contracts with 
employees every year.264 Experienced representatives of college 
athletes will be able to negotiate expeditiously with member 
institutions to reach agreement on the approximately twenty two 
football players each year (eighty-five football scholarships total are 
allowed for each FBS team) and three or four basketball players each 
year (fifteen basketball scholarships total are allowed for each Division 
 
262 Id. 
263 Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998). 
264 See, e.g., Negotiating Academic Job Offers, UNIV. OF NEB., http://www.unl.edu/grad 
studies/current/news/negotiating-academic-job-offers (last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (providing 
tips and suggestions on how to negotiate an employment contract with a university); see 
also Patricia Rogers & Sarah Drake, UT is Austin’s Largest Employer, AUSTIN BUS. 
JOURNAL (Jun 8, 2012, 2:27 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/austin/news/2012/06/08/ut-
is-austins-largest-employer.html (indicating the University of Texas employed 21,626 
people in 2012). 
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I basketball team).265 Just as universities figure out how to compensate 
all their employees, they will also figure out how to compensate 
approximately twenty-five new college athletes each year without 
substantial transaction costs.266 This procompetitive justification of 
cost should not be accepted either. 
If one of the purported procompetitive justifications is somehow 
accepted for capping athlete compensation at the scholarship amount, 
particularly that consumer demand will decrease if college athletes 
receive compensation and are no longer amateurs, then it will be 
difficult to show that the anticompetitive restraint could be 
accomplished in less restrictive means. That justification, as shown in 
O’Bannon, presumably precludes any payment of college athletes 
above their scholarship amounts beyond the full cost of attendance.267 
A less restrictive means, however, could include the NCAA allowing 
schools to hold the compensation in trust for each athlete until his 
eligibility expires. This would prevent the athlete from receiving 
money during college, which might help maintain the façade of 
amateurism. Education would not suffer provided that academic 
requirements to play and, thus, to receive compensation, continued to 
serve as a condition to playing.268 Requiring that a college athlete meet 
the necessary academic requirements to remain eligible to play and 
receive compensation “might even strengthen student-athletes’ 
incentives to focus on schoolwork.”269 
Also, it must be noted that the reasoning behind the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that a payment of $5000 per year in deferred compensation was 
improper—because it was not tethered to educational expenses—
ignores the economic reality of major college athletics.270 The Ninth 
Circuit, in effect, argued that college athlete benefits should be tethered 
to higher education instead of the multibillion dollar business of major 
 
265 See College Football Scholarships, COLLEGESCHOLARSHIPS.ORG, http://www 
.collegescholarships.org/scholarships/sports/football.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2016) 
(stating that each school in Division I can give a total of eighty-five scholarships for 
football); Basketball Scholarships for Men and Women, COLLEGESCHOLARSHIPS.ORG, 
http://www .collegescholarships.org/scholarships/sports/basketball.htm (last visited Oct. 
28, 2016) (stating that each school in Division I can give fifteen scholarships for men’s 
basketball). 
266 See Rogers & Drake, supra note 264 (indicating the University of Texas at Austin 
employed 21,626 people in 2012). 
267 See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d at 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015). 
268 See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
269 Id. 
270 See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078. 
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college athletics when the salaries and bonuses of every other actor in 
college athletics, such as coaches, athletic directors, and NCAA 
executives, are completely untethered to the educational expenses of 
college athletes. The court, in effect, serves to perpetuate the 
differential treatment between all of those involved in college athletes 
who earn considerable compensation (coaches, athletic directors, 
NCAA executives) and college athletes, who actually provide the 
product on the field or court, but are limited in what they can earn for 
their efforts. 
5. Application of the Rule of Reason Analysis to College Athlete 
Compensation from Name, Image, and Likeness271 
This Part applies the rule of reason analysis to compensation for 
college athletes relating to their names, images and likenesses. Here, 
the NCAA and member institutions’ restriction on college athletes 
earning based on their names, images, and likenesses results in a 
significant anticompetitive effect. 
The relevant market includes the national market available for 
endorsing products.272 Within this market, several submarkets exist 
that are based on the actual product being sold, which could include 
shoes, food, cars, or any merchandise that could be linked to college 
athletes.273 A regional and local market also exists for these and similar 
products. Another national market exists for selling autographs and 
memorabilia, as do regional and local markets. Absent NCAA 
restrictions on college athlete compensation, individual FBS football 
and Division I basketball players would be able to license their names, 
images, and likenesses to merchandisers in these markets.274 
 
271 This argument is premised on the notion that college athletes possess a right of 
publicity. Numerous legal scholars conclude that college athletes do possess that right. See 
generally Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185 (2012) 
(arguing the right of publicity is a right that should be inalienable, and college athletes 
should not be allowed to relinquish their rights of publicity to the NCAA); Leslie E. Wong, 
Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O’Bannon Takes on the NCAA for Infringing on the 
Former Student-Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1069, 1082–89 (2010) 
(contending a college athlete’s identity extends beyond his name, and includes his likeness 
and even his jersey number and arguing the NCAA and EA Sports are gaining commercially 
from the wrongful use of college athletes’ likenesses). 
272 See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 968 (discussing the two national markets that are 
allegedly restrained by the NCAA). 
273 See id. (indicating the two national markets can be divided into submarkets because 
each market involves different sellers, buyers, and products). 
274 See id. 
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The sellers in this market would be the athletes. Based on the 
NCAA’s unreasonable restraint, individual college athletes are 
precluded from competing against one another to license their 
individual names, images, and likenesses.275 
The NCAA restraint also prohibits competition among buyers of 
these college athletes’ rights.276 Certainly, Nike and Adidas would 
compete with each other to earn the rights for a high-profile college 
athlete to endorse their products. If Nike and Adidas each believed that 
it could sell more shoes or clothing because Ben Simmons (the former 
freshman star of LSU’s men’s basketball team and the number one pick 
in the 2016 NBA draft277) endorsed its product, then those companies 
would compete furiously to obtain those rights from Ben Simmons. 
NCAA rules, therefore, constitute a blanket prohibition against 
college athletes from earning income for their names, images, and 
likenesses, hinder competition among buyers and sellers in these 
markets, and clearly result in anticompetitive effects.278 
The procompetitive justifications that the NCAA and member 
institutions might put forth would be similar to, and identical in parts 
to, the ones made in the preceding Part on athlete compensation for 
their athletic services. Those should fail here for the same reasons they 
should fail above. The NCAA might argue that the product on the field 
may be hindered if college athletes fail to make practice or stay eligible 
because they were doing too many commercials or signings. The 
college athlete, though, would need to agree that he would not be 
eligible to license his name, image, or likeness if he failed to attend 
practice or meet academic requirements. Also, this potential issue is 
self-correcting because if a player performs worse on the field or court, 
no one will want to pay for his name, image, or likeness; he would have 
a greater incentive to play even better in games. 
Thus, even if a procompetitive justification could be found, 
requiring a student to meet academic eligibility requirements and 
participate in practice and games—as a prerequisite to being eligible to 
 
275 See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 271, at 188 (indicating the NCAA precludes players 
from “making endorsements or appearing in commercials, posters, or other 
merchandizing”). 
276 See, e.g., O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 997. 
277 Ohm Youngmisuk, Sixers Take LSU’s Ben Simmons with No. 1 Overall Pick, ESPN 
(June 24, 2016), http://www.espn.com/nba/draft2016/story/_/id/16458660/2016-nba-draft    
-philadelphia-76ers-take-ben-simmons-no-1-overall-pick. 
278 See Neil Gibson, NCAA Scholarship Restrictions as Anticompetitive Measures: The 
One-Year Rule and Scholarship Caps as Avenues for Antitrust Scrutiny, 3 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 203, 209 (2012). 
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license his name, image, or likeness—would be less restrictive than the 
blanket prohibition that now exists. Also, placing guidelines or time 
restrictions on when commercials or signings could take place would 
be less restrictive than the process now, which completely forbids any 
endorsements by college athletes. 
III 
RESPONDING TO ARGUMENTS AGAINST COLLEGE ATHLETES 
RECEIVING PAYMENT OR LICENSING THEIR NAMES, IMAGES, AND 
LIKENESSES 
This Article already addressed several major arguments against 
compensating college athletes, including amateurism. This Part 
discusses several other major arguments against paying college 
athletes. 
A. College Athletes Already Receive Compensation for What They Do 
Some argue that college athletes already receive a free education 
with their tuition, room, and board fully paid for by the university that 
grants them a scholarship.279 College athletes also receive free 
tutoring.280 College athletes receive exposure to professional teams and 
 
279 See McCauley, supra note 35; Horace Mitchell, Students Are Not Professional 
Athletes, US NEWS (Jan. 6, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014 
/01/06/ncaa-athletes-should-not-be-paid (arguing college athletes should not be paid since 
they are able to receive scholarships “to pay tuition, fees, room and board, and other 
allowable expenses”). 
280 Pete Thamel, Athletes Get New College Pitch: Check Out Our Tutoring Center, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/04/sports/ncaafootball/04ncaa 
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“All of the nation’s more than 100 major college athletic 
departments employ some type of academic support program. So do some Ivy League 
colleges and other smaller institutions. The National Collegiate Athletic Association said 
Division I athletic departments spend at least $150 million annually on such programs.”); 
see also Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, et al., What’s in a Name? The Collegiate Mark, the 
Collegiate Model, and the Treatment of Student-Athletes, 92 OR. L. REV. 879, 900–01 
(2014) (discussing how college athletes also may receive tutoring and academic counselors, 
team apparel, including shoes, and access to exclusive academic services facilities). One 
might argue that college athletes may also receive an advantage in job searching and 
admission to graduate schools because some employers or schools may prefer college 
athletes because they tend to be disciplined, excellent time managers, and adept at 
overcoming challenges. Even if all of those assumptions are true, tennis players, golfers, 
and swimmers also reap the benefits from those assumptions, but their sports do not generate 
millions of dollars as football or men’s basketball programs do. See SCHWARZ, supra note 
106, at 50–54; McCormick & McCormick, supra note 123, at 98 (stating that football and 
men’s basketball are considered revenue-generating sports). The revenue generated by 
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enjoy the opportunity to play the sport they love in front of millions of 
people. Responses to part of this argument can be found in Part I supra, 
but this argument fails because it disregards the market that would exist 
to compensate college athletes if the NCAA’s restrictions were 
removed. In other words, the issue should not be whether college 
athletes already receive compensation for playing football, but 
whether, in a free market, universities and colleges would compensate 
college athletes above their scholarship amounts if they were 
competing for their services. The answer is clearly yes. We already 
have alumni and boosters paying college athletes to play for their 
respective schools in violation of NCAA rules.281 Based on the amount 
of revenue and publicity college athletes generate for the schools, FBS 
and Division I schools would fiercely compete to recruit and 
compensate their athletes.282 
Similarly, third parties would compete and pay for the rights to use 
a college athlete’s name, image, or likeness if they believed an 
endorsement from a high-profile athlete would help sell their 
product.283 In a free market, the fact that a college athlete already 
received a scholarship for tuition, room, board, and books would not 
prevent Nike or McDonald’s from compensating a college athlete to 
endorse its products to increase its bottom line. 
B. Team Dynamics Will Falter 
Opponents also argue that college athletes could not handle fellow 
teammates making different amounts of money through either payment 
for playing or through endorsements.284 There would be “fights in the 
locker room” and a “separation of athletes.”285 Jay Bilas argues that 
these assertions are “total nonsense.”286 He states, “[i]t’s patently 
absurd that there would be fights in the locker room if the best player 
made more money than the last player on the team or when the 
quarterback makes more than the person who snaps him the football, 
 
football and men’s basketball programs typically pay for the other sports programs at a 
school. See SCHWARZ, supra note 106, at 50–54. 
281 See, e.g., Ubben, supra note 254. 
282 See McCauley, supra note 35. 
283 E.g., Darren Rovell, Johnny Manziel Signs with Nike, ESPN (Mar. 6, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/10564858/johnny-manziel-signs-multi-year-endorsement 
-contract-nike (discussing how Nike signed Manziel to an endorsement deal within a few 
months after his college eligibility expired and even before he was drafted in the NFL). 
284 See SCHWARZ, supra note 106, at 50–54; Bilas Interview, supra note 17. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
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just as there aren’t fights in the locker room among coaches when the 
head coach makes more money than the assistants.”287 
In my experience, athletes view sports as a meritocracy. An athlete 
knows that if he is the best player on the team, then he will play, 
regardless of who his parents are or how much money his family 
contributes to the school. At the college level, coaches need their best 
players to play to protect their own jobs. Athletes understand that 
whoever produces on the field or the court will receive the accolades—
e.g., being named all-American, all-conference, player of the week, 
most valuable player on the team. College athletes typically received 
similar accolades in high school, while most of their teammates in high 
school did not. Athletes can accept other athletes’ success because 
athletes typically believe that success is earned. 
Bilas sarcastically contends that, if we want to treat all athletes alike, 
then every athlete would play the same amount of minutes in the games, 
everyone would rotate as starters throughout the season, everyone 
(including walk-ons) would talk to the media (“media that we’ve sold 
these players to”), and everyone would be on the cover of a magazine, 
not just the stars of the team.288 Bilas suggests that participation 
trophies would be in order, while all-American honors would not be 
appropriate in such a model.289 
Confession: The Passage of Time Brings Clarity 
If some of my teammates had received endorsement deals from 
national, regional, or local companies (such as a local restaurant or 
furniture store), while I had not, then I would have felt just fine, 
because those players were the ones who were bringing in the few fans 
that came to our games anyway. If my teammates earned all-conference 
or all-American honors, then they would have deserved whatever 
endorsements they could have received. I confess that I was not nearly 
as good a player in college as I thought I was at that time. The passage 
of time brings clarity, but even college athletes with a skewed view of 
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C. The NCAA, or Even Congress, Will Reform Itself 
Some argue that the NCAA needs to change the rules, and that 
argument might be based on the changes it has already made. The 
NCAA did allow schools to provide travel vouchers for the families of 
players in the FBS playoffs.290 The NCAA does send a large portion of 
the money it receives back to the programs, although the players 
themselves do not receive any of that money personally.291 The NCAA 
also stopped exploiting college athletes to a limited extent when it 
discontinued the sale of college athletes’ jerseys on its Web site.292 
The changes the NCAA makes, however, are typically precipitated 
by pending lawsuits or public embarrassment.293 For example, Jay 
Bilas performed a search on the NCAA’s Web site that sold jerseys.294 
Although the players’ names do not appear on the jerseys themselves, 
when Bilas typed in certain college athlete names, including Johnny 
Manziel and Jadeveon Clowney, the site took him to their respective 
schools and respective jersey numbers.295 Once Bilas exposed the 
NCAA’s exploitation of college athletes through profits generated from 
selling their jerseys, the NCAA announced that it “would stop selling 
individual jerseys and other team-related memorabilia on its Web site, 
calling the practice a ‘mistake’ and admitting others might view it as 
hypocritical.”296 
As discussed above, NCAA autonomy legislation falls short of 
allowing a college athlete to realize the compensation he could attain 
because the autonomy rules only allow a school to offer compensation 
up to the full cost of attendance.297 
Holding their breath waiting for the benevolence and wisdom of the 
NCAA to devise a system that takes money out of its own hands and 
 
290 NCAA Paying for Parents to Get to Final Four, but Will This Pilot Program Become 
Permanent?, DAILY NEWS (Apr. 1, 2015, 11:54 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports 
/college/ncaa-paying-parents-final-indianapolis-article-1.2169548 (explaining the NCAA 
paid “for the parents or guardians of Ohio State and Oregon players to travel to Arlington, 
Texas for the national championship game”). 
291 See The NCAA Budget: Where the Money Goes, NCAA (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety/sport-science-institute/ncaa-budget-where-money     
-goes. 




295 See e.g., id. 
296 Id. 
297 See, e.g., Bennet, supra note 16; Bilas Interview, supra note 17. 
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its member institutions, while reallocating that money to college 
athletes, will leave college athletes gasping for air. 
A 2015 law review article chronicled the lawsuits college athletes 
have brought against the NCAA over the years.298 The article 
demonstrates, among other things, the NCAA’s resolve to battle in 
courts any efforts to reallocate money to athletes.299 Professors Matt 
Mitten and Stephen F. Ross acknowledged in their latest article that the 
NCAA cannot be trusted to regulate itself, particularly when its own 
interests might be subverted.300 
Similarly, waiting for Congress to solve this issue will likely result 
in the same inaction and disappointment as would waiting for the 
NCAA to remedy these inequities for college athletes. The polarization 
of the political parties in this country makes it seem unlikely that 
Congress could agree on anything, including whether college athletes 
should be compensated, if it ever decided to address this issue in earnest 
in the first place. Some members of Congress might, for example, 
advocate for the prohibition against athlete payments by granting the 
NCAA an antitrust exemption.301 
Some argue that antitrust law does not serve as the best avenue to 
address the issue of college athlete compensation.302 When Congress 
passed the Sherman Act in 1890, it probably did not intend to regulate 
college sports through that Act, but Congress also probably did not 
envision that college sports would evolve into a multibillion dollar 
industry in which colleges, coaches, NCAA executives, and athletic 
directors receive millions of dollars while the athletes do not. 
IV 
THE FREE MARKET SYSTEM COMPENSATING COLLEGE ATHLETES 
Many people conflate the issue of the logistics of paying college 
athletes with the primary question of whether college athletes should 
 
298 Michael H. LeRoy, Courts and the Future of “Athletic Labor” in College Sports, 57 
ARIZ. L. REV. 475, 483 (2015) (noting college athletes, even if they win in trial court, 
typically lose on appeal). 
299 Id. 
300 See Mitten & Ross, supra note 38, at 859–60 (discussing the NCAA’s disregard for 
the welfare of college athletes and its policies that tend to exploit them). 
301 See Jon Solomon, Can Congress (yes, Congress) Help NCAA Find Solutions?, 
CBSSPORTS (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solo 
mon/24666147/can-congress-yes-congress-help-ncaa-find-solutions (explaining Congress 
could grant the NCAA an exemption). 
302 See Mitten & Ross, supra note 38, at 861–62. 
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be paid in order to prevent the latter from being answered in the 
affirmative. If one agrees that college athletes should be compensated, 
then certainly a procedure for paying them can be created and 
employed. The free market approach provides an example of how 
college athletes can be compensated. 
A. Compensation for Playing 
Jay Bilas and the Jenkins case seek a true free market to compensate 
college athletes.303 In a free market, a school and its potential athlete 
would negotiate the length of the scholarship, its amount, and its 
terms.304 Bilas correctly points out that the parties would engage in 
arms-length negotiations to protect the school’s interests and the 
athlete’s interests, which is “the way it happens in every business 
context in America, except for college athletics.”305 Athletes would 
likely seek multiyear scholarships (two to four years), an amount per 
year that the college would be willing to pay, and an independent 
review of academic performance to ensure that the athlete is not being 
removed from the school for disappointing athletic performance.306 
The school would likely seek a non-compete clause in the contract to 
prevent the player from turning professional or playing “somewhere 
else during the term of the contract,” as well as a “behavioral clause 
and an academic performance clause.”307 The behavioral clause and 
academic performance clause would ensure that college athletes are 
conducting themselves in a manner that comports with the athletic 
program’s and university’s standards while remaining in good 
academic standing.308 
Bilas does not oppose a salary cap, which this Article argues would 
be essential for any system that involved the payment of college 
athletes.309 If Alabama boosters are willing to pay its head football 
coach’s mortgage on a $3 million mansion, then those same boosters 
may not perceive money as an object in trying to secure a college 
 
303 Bilas Interview, supra note 17. 




308 See id. 
309 See id. The cap should be determined by collective bargaining between the NCAA, 
its member institutions, and representatives of the college athletes (e.g., perhaps lawyers 
who represent or have represented athletes in cases, such as Jeffrey Kessler in the Jenkins 
action or Michael Hausfeld from the O’Bannon litigation, could negotiate on behalf of the 
athletes). 
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athlete’s services to play for Alabama.310 Under a rule of reason 
analysis, a salary cap would be anticompetitive because it would 
prohibit universities from providing compensation to college athletes 
beyond a certain amount, but it would help maintain competitive 
balance, thus constituting an acceptable procompetitive justification. 
Without a salary cap, Alabama, for example, might pay each of its 
scholarship athletes $500,000 a year. A salary cap, which the NFL and 
NBA employ, would represent a less restrictive means to maintain a 
competitive balance despite the restraint on the compensation of 
college athletes.311 
Provided there is a salary cap, each school could budget the amount 
it is willing to pay college athletes. For example, if the salary cap for 
football is $3 million per year per team, then a school’s budget might 
include a reduction in either the coaches’ salaries or the amount of 
money spent on facilities, or both (or some other expense), depending 
on what each school’s budget entails. Under this system, teams like 
Rice may have a better chance to procure the services of four to five-
star college athletes who typically would not even consider playing at 
Rice instead of Alabama, Notre Dame, or Florida State.312 Bilas argues 
that a small school may not be able to afford the University of Texas’ 
 
310 One may argue that compensating athletes might be difficult to enforce because of 
potential improper payments to college athletes, but that already happens today when 
athletes cannot receive any money for playing. See Ubben, supra note 254. 
311 Revenues include all revenue streams, including “ticket sales, revenue from luxury 
box suites and premium seating, local and national broadcasting (TV/radio/Internet) 
royalties, concessions, parking, local advertising, stadium leasing, and merchandising,” and 
in the NFL, the salary cap is based on a percentage of the total revenues generated by the 
teams. See Al Lackner, NFL Salary Cap FAQ, ASKTHECOMMISH.COM, THE FANTASY 
ADVISORS, http://www.askthecommish.com/SalaryCap/Faq.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 
2016); NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 81 
(Aug. 4, 2011), https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agree 
ment-2011-2020.pdf. The NBA’s salary cap is determined in a similar fashion (according to 
its collective bargaining agreement between the league and the NBA Players Association) 
by using the income generated by the league and its team, which is referred to as the 
basketball related income that includes, among other things, “gate receipts, broadcast rights, 
program and concession sales, parking, and [p]roceeds from team sponsorships and team 
promotions.” Larry Coon, NBA Salary Cap FAQ (July 3, 2016), http://www.cbafaq.com 
/salarycap.htm#Q12. 
312 See Bilas Interview, supra note 17. High school recruits are typically rated on a scale 
of two to five by recruiting services, with a rating of five reserved for rare talents that are 
the most sought after recruits. See Jeff Nusser, Rivals, Scout, ESPN, 247: Star Rating 
Systems Explained, COUGAR CTR. (Jan. 31, 2016), http://www.cougcenter.com/wsu                 
-football-recruiting/2013/2/5/3956800/rivals-scout-espn-247-star-rating-system-national-
signing-day. 
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best player, but it might be able to outbid Texas for its fourth best 
player.313 The small school has “no shot right now to get [UT’s] fourth 
best player in the current system. But if [the small school is] allowed 
to pay, [then it has] a reasonable shot to get that player or someone like 
him [. . .] that would normally be on somebody else’s roster.”314 A free 
market approach would make the smaller schools more competitive by 
allowing them to focus their resources on procuring talent.315 The 
current system simply allows the rich to get richer.316 
One potential argument against the free market system is that 
payment for athletes would be based on potential rather than 
performance. For example, if the highest rated high school quarterback 
enters into a contract with a university to play, his salary will be based 
on his potential to succeed in college, rather than how he performs in 
college. Even though he is highly rated, he may fail in college football 
because he cannot read college defenses or the speed of the game is too 
fast, for example. In a free market system, however, universities and 
athletes can fashion a contract however they want, including using a 
contract with a smaller base salary that is incentive-laden based on 
performance. For instance, the highly-rated high school quarterback 
might agree to a contract with a $20,000 base salary with the following 
incentives: $10,000 for starting every game in a season; $15,000 each 
for leading the conference in either passing yards, passing touchdowns, 
or passing efficiency (with a potential for $45,000 if he leads the 
conference in all three categories); and $20,000 for being named 
conference offensive player of the year. The free market system would 
allow colleges and athletes to negotiate performance-based contracts to 
avoid predicating college athlete salary on potential alone. 
B. Compensation for Endorsements 
The NCAA and its member institutions could regulate college 
athlete endorsement deals and signings (of autographs and 
memorabilia) by prescribing certain times and places when the 
commercials, photo shoots, and signings would take place (e.g., 






317 Although not central to this Article, I will address Title IX briefly. As an initial matter, 
Title IX involves resources and opportunities provided by universities and colleges to its 
athletes, not compensation from third parties, the latter of which would be at issue in a 
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NCAA could also regulate the manner in which companies contact 
college athletes. For example, each company that wanted the Notre 
Dame quarterback to endorse its products might be required to submit 
its company information and proposal to the football office, who would 
then contact the college athlete, a pro bono attorney, or agent that 
would help the college athlete reach a deal with the company. Lawyers 
and agents would theoretically be lining up around the block to work 
for free in the hope that they could represent the athlete in professional 
sports in the future. The school could also vet these lawyers and agents. 
Alternatively, lawyers and agents could receive compensation for their 
efforts in securing and finalizing any deals made on behalf of a college 
athlete. 
Professor Gabe Feldman, the Director of the Tulane Sports Law 
Program and the Associate Provost for NCAA Compliance, supports 
compensation for athletes based on commercial deals. Professor 
Feldman proposed a general framework for college athletes to license 
their names, images, and likenesses in a White Paper presented to the 
Knight Commission.318 The Knight Commission is an organization 
that provides recommendations to the NCAA (a number of which the 
NCAA adopts) to ensure college athletic programs operate within the 
educational goals and missions of universities. In his White Paper, 
Professor Feldman argues that “[o]pening up a well-regulated market 
for non-game related [name, image, and likeness] payments can also 
help close the black market that has sprouted up to work around the 
 
commercial or endorsement deal between a college athlete and a third party company. See 
Nicolas A. Novy, “The Emperor Has No Clothes”: The NCAA’s Last Chance as the Middle 
Man in College Athletics, 21 SPORTS LAW J. 227, 251–52 (2014). Also, third parties might 
choose to enter into endorsement deals with male or female athletes depending on the third 
party’s product, audience, and the particular athlete. In other words, female athletes would 
not be precluded from entering into endorsement deals if college athletes were allowed to 
do so. Thus, Title IX is not implicated in college athlete compensation for endorsement deals 
as discussed in this Article. Id. With regard to college athlete compensation for playing 
football or men’s basketball, Title IX would be implicated. See Robert Grimmett-Norris, 
Comment, Roadblocks: Examining Title IX & The Fair Compensation of Division I 
Intercollegiate Student-Athletes, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 435, 439–40 (2015) 
(discussing the objectives of Title IX, implying that since Title IX states no person shall be 
excluded from participation based on sex, paying male athletes alone would bring this 
scenario under Title IX). Antitrust economist Andrew Schwarz argues that Title IX does not 
preclude compensation for college athletes playing football or men’s basketball. For more 
information, see SCHWARZ, supra note 106, at 50–54. 
318 GABE FELDMAN, WHITE PAPER: THE NCAA AND “NON-GAME RELATED” STUDENT-
ATHLETE NAME, IMAGE AND LIKENESS RESTRICTIONS, KNIGHT COMM’N ON 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (2016), http://www.knightcommission.org/images/pdfs 
/feldman_nil_white_paper_may_2016.pdf. 
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restrictions.”319 He argues that “[t]he current restrictions create an 
incentive and temptation for student-athletes to violate the rules and 
receive under-the-table benefits from boosters, agents, third parties, 
and others.”320 
The general framework of Professor Feldman’s proposal allows 
college athletes to license their names, images, and likenesses for “non-
game related321 commercial purposes, [such as] endorsements, product 
licensing, personal appearances, books, movies, television or radio 
shows, or providing autographs,” subject to approval by an oversight 
committee.322 The oversight committee would be comprised of 
“representatives from the NCAA, conferences, athletic departments, 
faculty, current and former student-athletes, and individuals with 
expertise in NIL-related markets.”323 
C. Advantages of Compensating College Athletes 
The advantages, both direct and indirect, stemming from 
compensating college athletes above their scholarship amount are 
plentiful. First, allowing college athletes to receive compensation for 
the revenues they generate and their names, images, or likenesses 
satisfies notions of equity and falls in line with antitrust law. Second, 
as noted by the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon, “athletes might well be 
more likely to attend college, and stay there longer, if they knew that 
they were earning some amount of NIL income while they were in 
school.”324 A free market system allowing a college athlete, who may 
come from a disadvantaged background or a lower socioeconomic 
status, to contract to stay two to four years would benefit the college 




321 Id. (stating that the “proposal does not include ‘game-related’ uses of NIL, [which] 
include any broadcast, re-broadcast, photo, promotion, or any products derived from the 
broadcast of the underlying athletic competition (e.g., highlight reels, historical footage, 
etc.)”). 
322 Id. 
323 Id. Among the considerations the committee should use to determine whether to 
approve a commercial deal of college athletes are the appropriateness of the compensation 
for the college athletes, the “[a]ppropriateness of required activities,” the college athletes’ 
time commitment for the deal, and the “[c]haracter and integrity of the third party” involved 
with the deal. Id. 
324 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015). 
325 Bilas Interview, supra note 17. 
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agrees that most players would stay in school longer because they are 
being treated fairly and securing a deal at the front end of college.326 
If a college athlete stayed longer in school because he was receiving 
compensation, then he could also benefit educationally.327 He would 
earn more credits toward his degree and have the potential to graduate 
depending on how long he stayed. 
As for basketball, which currently has the “one-and-done” rule that 
allows college athletes to declare for the NBA draft after only one year 
of college, teams comprised of second, third, and fourth-year college 
athletes would also likely make the quality of the college game better 
because college athletes could develop at the school and benefit from 
two or three years in the same system.328 It might also make the NBA 
product better because the league would then be getting more 
developed, more mature players.329 
Staying in college longer allows college athletes the potential to 
mature as individuals, which will likely make them more successful in 
interpersonal relationships and in any profession they choose. Bilas 
agrees about the myriad of benefits that everyone, particularly the 
college athletes would receive, adding, “[t]here is no down side to this 
except the reallocation of money. That some people who are getting 
this money now would not get it in the new system.”330 
A free market system also allows a university to choose not to pay 
college athletes above scholarship amounts, or to pay only a select few 
of their athletes, as opposed to the entire team, and still maintain a 
football or men’s basketball program. If schools like Rice University 
chose not to pay any of its football players, or only a few, there would 
likely be plenty of athletes like me who would still prefer to play for 
Rice on a full scholarship, without a salary, than not to play Division I 
football at all. 
One consequence of paying college athletes might involve some 
universities and colleges withdrawing from Division I and FBS 
competition because of the further over-commercialization of college 
sports. Notre Dame President Rev. John I. Jenkins has said that if 
college athletes received payment for playing, “Notre Dame will leave 
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be damned, and explore the creation of a conference with like-minded 
universities.”331 The University of Chicago, once a dominant football 
team and charter member of the Big Ten, withdrew from college 
athletics because of the conflict between academics and the 
commercialization of college sports.332 
If schools do not want to be a part of this new system that allows 
college athletes to receive compensation above their scholarships, then 
they need not compete in Division I or the FBS, but that will preclude 
them from substantial revenues and publicity. Notre Dame maintains 
multimillion dollar deals with NBC and Under Armour.333 It is 
uncertain whether Notre Dame, or schools with similar lucrative deals 
that are generating vast revenue, would actually withdraw from major 
college sports, but schools seem quite content with the college sports 
economic system in place now, which generates billions of dollars of 
revenue for everyone involved—except college athletes. 
CONCLUSION 
College sports will not crumble if resources are reallocated in this 
multibillion dollar business to provide college athletes with 
compensation above their scholarship amounts. College athletes who 
are popular based on their performances on highly-rated televised 
games, as well as regular appearances on SportsCenter highlight reels, 
should also be able to license their names, images, and likenesses to 
earn money. The NCAA’s rules that deprive college athletes, some of 
whom live in abject poverty, of the opportunity to earn money for 
themselves and their families based on what a free market would allow, 
are not only inequitable, but they also directly conflict with this 
country’s antitrust laws and capitalist economy. 
 
 
331 Dan Barry, Notre Dame President Stands Firm Amid Shifts in College Athletics, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/sports/ncaafootball/notre         
-dame-president-stands-firm-amid-shifts-in-college-athletics.html. 
332 Complaint, supra note 138, ¶ 1. 
333 See Marc Tracy, Notre Dame and Under Armour Seek Win-Win with Apparel Deal, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/sports/football/notre         
-dame-and-under-armour-seek-win-win-with-apparel-deal.html (announcing the Notre 
Dame and Under Armour deal to be worth a reported $90 million over 10 years); NBC’s 
Notre Dame Deal Extended, ESPN (Apr. 18, 2013), http://espn.go.com/college-football 
/story/_/id/9186897/nbc-extends-notre-dame-fighting-irish-football-deal-2025 (describing 
the 10-year extension between Notre Dame and NBC as being worth $15 million annually). 
